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INDEX.
&CCORD AND SATISFACTION, 65.
ACCOUNTS. See BANK, 11; LMITATION, 7.
ACCOUNT RENDER.
1. After judgment of quad computet confessed by defendant, he is not com-
petent witness as to amount due. Tutton vs. Adams, 574.
2. The dismissal of a bill in equity is no bar to this action after a judg-
ment of quod computet. Id.
8. Auditor should bring the account down to the time of his report. t
ACTION AT LAW. See HUSBAND AND WinF, IV., V. ; INsunANcz, 15, 20;- LIs
PENDENS; USURY, 3, 4.
1. May be maintained in England in her own name by widow who -has such
right by foreign law. Van quein vs. Bouard, 488.
2. Will lie for tort committed abroad notwithstanding the pendency of pro-
ceedings in the foreign country for the same cause of action. Seymour vs.
Scott, 438.





1850, July 29th. See MORTGAGE, 48; SNIPnG, 4, 5.
1850, Sept. 28. See SwAxp LANDs.
1851, March 8. See MINES.
1855, Feb. 10, Sect. 2. See ALIEN, 11.
1861, July 18. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, I.
1862, May 20. See CONSTITTIONAL LAW, I.
1862, July 1. See INTERNAL REvENuE, STAmP.
1862, July 17. See PRIZE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
1863, March 3. See COURTS, 12.
ADMIRALTY.
1. The len of libellant on the land of the respondent will entitle him to a
bill of discovery against respondent and a third person who sets up a claim
under a different lien. Ward et al. vs. Chamberlain, 58.
2. A decree for the payment of money in an admiralty suit in personam




3. Exceptions to commissioner's report must state grounds. So of an answer
to a claim. The Commandcr-in-Chief, 693.
4. Objections to want of proper parties. Id.
5. Vessels transporting goods are carriers in such sense that the owners
may maintain action for cargo lost by collision. Id.
6. Decree not reversed for irregularity in language of decision where it is
obvious no error has been committed. Sturgis vs. Clough, 629.
kGENT. See INsuxmCx, 22, 82; TnUsT, 4; VENDOR, 1, 16.
1. An agent's liability to his principal for negligence by which a third per-
son has been injured, is only contingent, while it is direct and certain to the
party injured. Dodge et al vs. Bache, 244.
2. An action against the principal by the party injured is reainter alios acta
as to the agent, and the record is not admissible in evidence against him, ex-
cept as to the amount of damages. Id.
8. Therefore the rule that excludes an agent from testifying for his prin-
oipal in such an action, is not founded in clear reason, and should not be ex-
tended; and his testimony should not be rejected, except upon the quantum
of damages, unless his liability over has been clearly proved. Id.
4. Where an agent being specially instructed to contract for a vessel in his
own name, afterwards sold her, and put the proceeds in his pocket, the prin-
cipal's right is gone as against a bona fide purchaser. Calais Steamboat Co.
vs. Scudder, 62.
5. An agent, acting under a general power of attorney to draw or indoPrse
checks, has no authority to overdraw his principal's account at the bank:
Union Bank vs. Hott, 60.
6. If over drafts are made on such account, by the agent, through a fraud-
ulent collusion with the book-keeper, the loss must fall on the bank. 2.
7. Principal liable for fraud of agent, by acts in the course of legitimate
business. Ezchange Bank vs. Monteath, 700.
8. Agent who buys at iale of principal's land by third party, is not trustee
of such land for principal. Kennedy vs. Keating, 632.
ALIEN.
1. In the absence of any law of the United States governing the particular
ease, the question whether one born out of the United States is a citizen, is
to be determined by the common law, as it existed at the adoption of the Fed
eral Constitution. .Ludlam vs. Ludlam et al., 595.
2. At common-law, the duty of allegiance and the rights of citizenship pass-
e4 by descent, the child following the condition of the father; so that if a
father out of the realm was within the allegiance of the king, his child by an
alien wife was born a subject to the British crown. Id.
8. The statute (25 Edw. III, ch. 2) upon this point, is a declaratory, and
not an enabling act. Id.
4. Whether a citizen is capable of renouncing his allegiance without the
consent of his govirnment, or may when his government has not prohibited it,
gucre. Id.
5. But if be may, he cannot divest himself of his citizenship until he be-
comes the citizen of another government, and this he cannot do until he
arrives at full age. Id.
6. Where a citizen of the United States went to Peru at the age of eigh-
teen years, with the intention of indefinite continuance therebut took no steps
to be naturalized in Peru, or to indicate an intention of a permanent change
of domicil, his child born in Peru of an alien wife is a citizen of the United
States. Id.
7. A finding as of a fact, that the father voluntarily "expatriated" himself,
with the intention of becoming a permaneht resident of Peru, regarded as
immateriaL Id.
8. Such a child may, It seems, be subject to a double allegiance, and upon
arriving at his majority may elect to retain the one and repudiate the other;
but until such election he retains all the rights of citizenship in both countries,
though discharging its duties in but one. 1d.
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9. An alien woman married to an alien in a foreign country and continuing
to reside there until her husband's death, did not become a citizen of the
United States by the naturalization of her husband subsequent to their mar-
riage. Burton vs. Burton, 425.
10. She is, therefore, not entitled to dower under the laws of the state of
New York. Id.
11. Construction of the Act of Congress 10th February 1855, see. 2. fd.
12. May hold land until office found in Rhode Island. Cross vs. DTeValle,
630.•
13. May sue another in courts of this country on contract made abroad.
Roberts vs. Knihts, 697.
AMENDMENT. See EQUITY, 6.
1. In allowing amendments all legal defences, including those styled un-
conscionable, stand on an equal footing. Sheldon vs. Adams, 508.1 2. An amendment will not be allowed that would cut off the defence of the
statute of limitations. Id.
8. Nor an amendment by which a note liable to be assessed only for losses in
one class of hazards, is made liable for all losses. Id.
ARBITRATION AND AWARD. See BouNWAuY, 1.
1. Arbittators under statute cannot award the transfer of specific propetty.
Brown vs. Evans, 873.
2. An award which provides for the payment of an amount, after deduct-
ing sums not fixed by the award, is-invalid. Flsetcher vs. Webster, 62.
8. On claim to realty is void in New York. Wiles vs. Peck, 568.
4. Interest to disqualify arbitrators. Leominster vs. F'tchbM9g Railroad
Co., 505.
5. Presumption in favor of award. Id.
ASSAULT AND, BATTERY.
Evidence of special damage. Brown v. Cummings, 698.
ASSIGNMENT. See Furux: AcQlnisrioNs; INsu-Axmo, 26, 89, 42.
A judge's salary is assignable, and a purchaser for value of an assignment
to order, properly indorsed, acquires a good title. State vs. Bastingi, 378.
aSSIGNMENT FOR BENEFIT OF CREDITORS.
1. Not void for reserving property exempt from execution, without specify-
ing it. Smith vs. Aitchell, 248.
2. But it must fairly assign all the assignor's property liable for his debts.
Id.
3. What evidence admissible on the question of good faith, and of value of
property. rd.
4. Assignment by railroad company of unpaid subscriptions to stock to
secure an indorser for the company, is not an assignment for benefit of credi-
tors. McBroom and Woods' Appeal, 309.
5. Assignment in general terms referring to an annexed schedule may in-
clude property not named in the latter. Turner vs. ,]aycox et al., 318.
6. By partners may provide for payment of private debts out of the residue
after paying partnership debts. Id.
7. When the conduct of an assignor shows that he still claims and seeks to
derive a benefit from the property, to the prejudice of his creditors, it will
tend to show that the assignment was originally made with a fraudulent pur-
pose. .Flanigan vs. Lampman, 183.
8. The fact that the assignor, as agent for one of the creditors, purchased
part of the property at the assignee's sale, and afterwards continued in pos-
session of it himself, is evidence of the fraudulent intent. Id.
9. Property fraudulently put in the hands of a debtor for the purpose of
giving him a false credit, does not vest in the assignee under an assignment.
Audenried vs. Betterly, 62.
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10. Assignee may maintain trespass against one who interferes with the pro.
perty. .M'cQueen vs. Babcock, 701.
11. Subh action is not intermeddling within the terms of an injunction. 1d.
12. Such injunction is no bar to suit against a sheriff for taking the pro-
perty out of assignee's hands. Therefore the statute of limitations runs in his
favor. Id.
ASSUMPSIT. See TENANT IN CoMMON, 5.
1. For money had, &c., may be maintained by creditor against one to whom
his debtor has delivered money to pay the debt. Stoudt vs. Hine, 571.
2. No promise in writing is required, as the Statute of Frauds does not ap-
ply. Id.
3. Money paid by the putative father of an unborn bastard to the super-
intendent of the poor upon a compromise, may be recovered back upon its
appearing that the supposed mother was never pregnant. Ruhl vs. Hicks, 56.
4. Money paid voluntarily, under a mistake of facts, cannot be recovered
back. Brown vs. Rich, 188.
5. A moral obligation founded upon an antecedent valuable consideration
may be sufficient to sustain a promise though the obligation on which it is
founded never could have been enforced at law. Goulding vs. Davidson, 84.
ATTACHMENT. See BAsxs, 20; IxSOLvENCY, 8; INTEREST, 2; MUICIPAL Con-
PoRATION, 3, 4.
ATTORNEY. See CoUNsEL; JUDGMENT, 1.
1. Statute of limitations does not begin to run against claim for services,
until entry of judgment. Eliot vs. Lawton, 566.
2. One who practises in justice's courts, though not licensed attorney, may
be within the rules applicable to attorneys. .Freelove vs. Cole, 638.
AUDITOR. See ACCOUNT RENDER, 8; HUSBAND AND WIrE, 6.
BAILMENT, 821.
BANK. See AGENT, 5, 6: BILLS, 10, 18, 19, 20, 83, 35, 41; CONSTITUTIONAa
LAw, II.: CORPORATION.
1. There is no implied contract to pay the President for his services. Saw-
yer vs. Pawner'. Bank, 249.
2. A debtor sued by bank, cannot plead actszby which the latter has for-
feited its charter.' Such forfeiture can only be enforced by the State in a di-
rect proceeding. Farmers' Bank vs. Garten, 634.
8. The counting out of money to the person presenting a check, passes the
property in the money to the latter, and cannot be revoked. Chambers vs.
Miller, 439.
4. If a banker denies the right of a depositor, by placing the deposit to
credit of another person he is presently liable to action for the amount. Car-
roll vs. Cone, 319.
5. So where he voluntarily counts out the amount of the deposit and hands
it to a sheriff to levy upon. Id.
6. The money so counted out was his own property and not his depositor's.
.1d.
7. Charging of interest on customer's accounts. Crosskill vs. Bower, 438.
8. Cannot refuse to allow income tax to a customer, upon interest accruing
on a mortgage security. Mosse vs. Salt, 439.
9. The discounting of bills when the customer's account is overdrawn
makes the bank a holder for value. In re Carew, 439.
10. If bank takes a mortgage security from a customer for a fixed sum
owing by the latter, the relation of banker and customer ceases as to that
sum. osse vs. Salt. 442.
11. Habitual mode of making out an account is evidence of an agreement
that it should be so made. Mosse vs. Salt, 439.
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12. In the absence of special agreement, express or implied, the custom
of bankers may be proved. Afosse vs. Salt, 439.
13. Disputed entry in pass-book is for the jury. Snead vs. Williams, 442.
BASTARD. See AssumpsiT, 3.
BILLS AND NOTES. See AMENDUENT, 8; BANE, 9; LIMITATION. 5, 6; MU-
cHANzc's LIEN, 1; MORTGAGE, 6, 19, 20; NEGOTIABL BONDS; Ustmra, 7
L What amounts to.
1. Note payable "subject to the policy" not negotiable. Bank vs. Blan-
chard, 567.
2. Instruments amounting to. Ob vs. Davis, 439. Watson vs. Evans, 440.
II. Consideration.
3. The issuing of a policy, by an insolvent company, is a good considera-
tion for a note given for the premium, if the insolvency was not known at
the time. Lester V. Webb, 62.
4. One who signs as principal a promissory note, which has already been
delivered and accepted, is not liable thereon, without proof of a new con-
sideration. Green vs. Shepherd, 62.
5. Note payable on alternative condition. Consideration to give a scholar-
ship in another institution. Genesee College vs. Dodge, 570.
I.I. tiability of Parties. .
6. One who takes a promissory note without consideration takes it subject
to all its infirmities in his assignor's hands. Harpham vs. Haynes, Z13.
7. Indorsee even with notice. takes a note subject only to such equities an
attach to the instrument itself. Mattoon vs. McDaniel, 634.
8. Indorser of blank note cannot object as against a bona fide holder for
value that the blhnks have been improperly filled. Farmers' Bank vs. Gar-
ten, 634.
9. A signing on condition which is not fulfilled is no defence against a bona
fide holder for value. Watswo vs. Russell. 440.
10. Where a note is signed as cashier, parol evidence allowed to show of
what bank. Baldwin vs. Bank of Newbury, 629.
11. Personal liability for note signed as secretary. Bottomlegvs. Fisher, 440.
12. Liability for note signed by agent in own name. Brown vs. Pa~ker, 567.
13. Suit in equity against acceptor of a lost bill. Edge vs. Bumford, 441.
14. Notice by surety to holder of note not yet due, to sue as soon as it
should become due, will not discharge him. Hellen vs. Crawford, 310.
15. Indorsee of bills given for debt but not accepted in absolute payment
has no right of action against the debtor except upon the bills. Battle vs.
Coit, 700.
A note given in pursuance of an illegal agreement, but not made void by the
statute may be recovered on by a bona fide receiver for value. Chesbrongh vs.
Wright, 444.
17. But one who takes the note in part payment of a precedent debt is not
such receiver for value. Id.
WV. Title to a Note.
18. Bank receiving note for collection has no better title than the remitting
bank unless it becomes a purchaser for value without notice. A!cAride vs.
Farmers' Bank, 636.
19. Having a balance against the remitting bank and refraining from draw-
mg it, or discounting notes for the latter, do not make the bank such pur-
chaser. Id.
20. Remitting bank having demanded the note and afterwards the proceeds,
assigned its demand. The assignor may maintain an action without new de-
mand, although the assignment was made to obviate the objection to an attach-
ment by a non-resident. Id.
21. Receiver of unindorsed note has no better title than the person from
whom he received it. Whistler vs. Foster, 440.
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BILLS AND NOTES.
22. Indorsement of note to two persons, with delivery, vests a valid title
in both, although one was absent at the-time, and they may maintain a joint
action upon it. Flint et al. vs. Flint, 120.
23. Wliere a guaranty of a note is a separate instrument, title to it will
pass by delivery with the note, for a good consideration. Gouldvs. Elery, 59.
24. Where J. made a contract for the sale of C.'s promissory notes to I,. when
he was not. the owner nor in possession, it was held, that there was no im-
plied warranty of title, and that the subsequent acquisition of it by J. did not
enure to the benefit of L. so as to render a payment by C. to him good, and
an extinguishment of the note. Scranton vs. Clark, 125.
V. Payment;
25. On a note payable in specie plaintiff qan only recover the face with in-
terest, though specie be at premium. Wood vs. Bullens, 373.
26. Renewal note retained by the payee, is satisfaction, under the circum-
stances, of the first. Sage vs. llaker, 765.
27. An indorser who takes up a note and gives a new one of his own for it,
has a right to regard this as a payment as between him and his principal.
Wilkinson vs. Stewart, 313.
VI. Demand and lotice.
28. An express company contracted in Indiana, to present a bill drawn and
indorsed by parties in that state, and accepted payable in New York. The
bill was placed in the hands of a competent notary in New York a day before
its maturity, and was, on that day, presented and protested, whereby the
indorsers were discharged. On suit brought against the express company
for their neglect, it was urged that the contract of the company was per-
formed when the bill was put into the notary's hands. This question ex-
amined, but not decided. American Ezpres Co. vs. Dunlenj, 266.
29. The express company, by delivering the bill to the notary on the day
before its maturity, had made that officer their agent to hold and collect the
paper. This employment had nothing to do with the notary's official charac-
ter. On this ground the express company is liable. Id.
30. The measure of damages is the face of the bill and interest. rd.
31. Foreign bill must be protested by a notary. ANote to American .Fxpress
Co. vs. Dunlevy, 271.
32. A bill drawn in one state payable in another is a foreign bill. Id.
33. Liability of persons receiving bills on deposit, for transmission or col-
lection. Id.
34. For purposes of protest a collecting agent is a holder. State Bank vs.
Bank of the Capital, 701.
. 35. bauk acting as collecting agent merely need only notify its immediate
iprincipal or indorser. Id.
36. Its undertaking to notify other parties is not sufficient evidence of
agreement to notify all. Id.
37. Holder of note as collateral must present it at maturity. Peacock vs.
Percell, 440.
38. Presentment at the place of date is sufficient, in absence of proof that
the holder knew the maker resided elsewhere. Smith vs. Philbrick, 187.
VII.. Grace.
39. Maker has the whole of the last day of grace to pay in, without regard
to banking hours. Smith vs. Aylesworth, 254.
40. Maker has all the last day of grace, though he may have refused pay-
ment during the day. Oothout vs. Ballard, 444.
41. It is immaterial whether the note is payable at a bank or at large. Id.
B3OUNDARY.
1. An oral award by referees, under an oral submission, is competent
evidence upon a question of disputed boundary between the parties. Byam
vs. Robbins, 120.
2. Oral agreement as to, uncertain. Proprietor vs. Prescott, 698.
INDEX.
BOUNTY.
Offered to volunteers is payable to drafted men allowed to volunteer for a
period longer than the draft called for. People vs. Hammond, 249.
CALIFORNIA LAND CLAIMS. See DEED, 9, 10; MINES.
CASES AFFIRMED, OVERRULED, ETC.
Aymar vs. N. River Bank, 8 Hill 268, affirmed. Exchange Bank vs. Mon.
teath, 700.
Bloomer vs. McQuewan, 11 Howard 549, approved. Bloomer vs. JRfilb,
ger, 695.
Bush vs. Steinman, 1 Bos. & Pull. 404, rejected as authority. Painter vs.
.Pittsburgh, 350.
Chaffee vs. Boston Belting Company, 22 Howard 223, approved. Bloomer
vs. Millinqer, 695.
Hawley vs. James, 5 Paige 442, distinguished. Cross vs. De Valle 680.
Langdale vs. Briggs, 39 E. C. L. R. 214, followed. Cross vs. De Valle, 630.
Lorilard vs. Coster. 5 Paige 172, distinguished. Cross vs. De Yalle, 630.
Noonan vs. Lee, 2 Black 499, recognised. Orchard vs. Hughes, 694.
Parker vs. Kane, 4 Wise. 1, approved. Howell vs. Howell, 878.
Rex vs. Horwell, 6 Carr. & P. 148, distinguished. People vs. Clements, 570.
Scribner vs. Fisher, 2 Gray 43, dissented from. Baldwin vs. Hale, 462.
United States vs. West's Heirs, reviewed. United States vs. Galbraith, 51.
Wennall vs. Adney, 8 Bos. & Pull. 252. Note to, commented on. Goulding
vs. Davidson, 84.
Wheaton vs. Hibbard, 20 Johns. 290. Dictum of SPENC ER, C. J., overruled.
Porter vs. Mount, 493.
CERTIORARI.
1. A common law certiorari, sued out after the time for a statutory appeal
which would have given the same remedy, will be quashed. Farrell vs. Tay-
or, 249.
2. The allowance of the writ in such case is not binding on the court. Id.
CHAMPERTY.
Purchase of legacy for less than its value from one too poor to sue, is not.
Tyson vs. Jachson, 441.
CHECK. See BASue, 3; CnxImIAL Lkw, V.
-A creditor who has zeceived from his debtor, a check upon a bank, cannot
return the same to the drawer, and sue upon the original cause of action,
without first demanding payment; and presenting the check to the bank to be
3ertified, is not equivalent to a demand of payment. Bradford vs. Foax, 61.
CITIZEN. See ALIEN.
COMMON CARRIER. See ADMIRALTY, 5; NEGLIGENCE, 11; RAILROAD, II.1. The ticket of a passenger includes also ordinary baggage but not mer-
chandise. Smith and Wife vs. The Boston and Maine Railroad, 127.
2. Not liable for loss of merchandise brought with him by a passenger as
baggage. Cahill vs. London, 1kc., Railroad Co., 441.
3. Is bound to deliver goods within a reasonable time, having reference to
his means of carrying. Hales vs. London, tc., Railroad Co., 441.
4. Liable for injury to passenger by defect of vehicle, though it was not
discoverable by any practicable mode of examination. Alden vs. New *York
Central Railroad Co., 498.
5. Condition that shipper assumes the risks of carrying does not relieve
carrier from ordinary liability. Falvel vs. N. T. Co., 379.
6. Cannot by a general notice exonerate himself entirely from legal liability.
Judson vs. lWestern Railroad Co., 316.
7. A carrier having a lien on goods for freight, &c., cannot sell the goods
to enforce his lien. Measure of damages where he does. Briggs vs. Boston,
1kc., Railroad Co., 250.
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COMMON CARRIER.
8. May be liable as forwarding agent only beyond his own route. N. R. .
Go. vs. Htchburg Railroad Co., 250. Briggs vs. Boston, Ike., Railroad Co., 250.
CONFLICT OF LAWS. See Cox=AcT, 2; HusBAnD AND Wnx, 2; IxsoL-
vzNcy, 1-8; LIMITATION, 1, 2.
1. Questions of procedure are to be determined by the lexfoi. HacFarlane
vs. Norris, 442.
2. Semble, that set-off is matter of procedure. Id.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. See CouiTs, 1, 12; MUNICIPAL ConrolToN, 21.
L Questions ariting out of the Rebellion. See INsuvxNcs, 87, 88.
1. The Act of Congress of 18th July 1861, and the President's Proclamation
of 16th August 1861, recognised an insurrection amounting to civil war, as
existing in the state .of Tennessee, but did not put in force against the people
of that state all the rights and privileges conferred on the National Govern-
=ent by the laws of war. Allen vs. Russell ef al., 861.
2. The expression "commercial intercourse" in the Act of 13th July 1861,
is to be considered as limited by the specifications in the act. Id.
8. Therefore, where a partnership of three persons existed in Kentucky,
and two of them, being disloyal, became residents in a rebellious qtate, au-l
there, after the Act. of Congress of 1861 and the President's Proclamation,
made a deed of assignment of the partnership property to a creditor in Ken-
tucky, for the purpose of securing his and other debts due by them to persons
in a loyal state, the making of such deed was not such "commercial inter-
course" as is within the prohibition of the Act of Congress and the Presi-
dent's Proclamation. Id.
4. Nor is it material that the creditor went into the rebellious state for the
purpose of procuring such deed, and brought it to Kentucky. The deed was
not an article of commerce within the Act of Congress and the -President's
Proclamation. rd.
5. By the laws of war the partnership was dissolved, but the third and
loyal partner was not a surviving partner. The others were not civilly dead
and no conviction of treason having ensued, their right of property still
remained and psesed under their deed. id.
6. By the Act of Congress of 13th July 1861, and the President's Procla-
mation in pursuance thereof, citizens of the rebellious states have prima facie
become for purposes of commerce quasi enemies and cannot sue in the United
States Courts. United States vs. 100 Barrets, 734.
7. But the granting of a license to trade restores the standing of the
grantee so as to enable him to be heard in the United States Courts. Id.
. 8. The act'of foreign nations in recognising the so-called Confederate
States as a belligerent, estops their subjects from disputing the lawfulness of
captures on the high seas by the United States forces. But such recognition
has no influence on the Courts of the United States, who are guided solely
by the action of the political department of their own government. Id.
9. Therefore in determining the status of rebel persons and property, the
courts are guided by municipal and not by international law. Id.
10. The Acts of Congress of 13th July.18Q1, and 20th May 1862, are pro-
hibitory acts, and the forfeiture under them of goods "proceeding to"
rebellious states can only be avoided by the production of such a license as
is provided in the acts. Therefore a license obtained through error, or mis-
take, or fraud, will not prevent the forfeiture. Id.
11. The Act of Congress of July 17th 1862, applies to suits for the recovery
of debts in the state as well as the Federal Courts. Norris vs. Doniphan, 471.
12. If the act is unconstitutional, Congress has no power to prohibit the
-state courts from giving to the owners of property seized the relief to which
they are entitled by the laws of the states. ..Id.
13. The forfeitures or confiscations proposed by this act are to be effected
u account of offences which the owner may commit, without reference to the
.xse of his property; hence, the doctrine that property which is used to
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violate a blockade, or revenue laws, may be forfeited by proceedings in rem,
without conviction of the owner, has no application to this cas e. Norris vs
Doniphan, 471.
14. That clause of the Constitution which authorizes Congress "to declare
war," &c., relates only to wars with foreign nations. Id.
15. The right given by the Constitution to make war upon rebels, gives the
power to perform acts of war, and no other power whatever. The seizure and
confiscation of enemies' property on land are not acts of war. Id.
16. The Constitution, and not the law of nations, governs the relations be-
tween the Government and citizens of the United States. They, though trai-
tors, must be dealt with according to the Constitution. I'd.
17. The act under consideration is unconstitutional. Id.
18. A person joining the rebellious states, and residing therein, cannot on
common law principles maintain an action in the courts of the United States
or of the loyal states. Id.
IL United States Notes, Stocks, and Loans. See GROUND-RENT, 2.
19. The Legislature of New York, by an act of 1863, provided that banks
shall be liable to taxation on a valuation equal to the amount of their capital
stockpaid in, or secured to be paid in, and their surplus. earnings less 10 per
cent., deducting the value of their real estate. Held, that the meaning of the
words "capital stock paid in, or secured to be paid in," is the original capital
of a bank, as distinguished from that which it possesses when a given tax is
laid. The People vs. Commissioners of Taxes, 535.
20. The Bank of C. having had a capital actually paid in of $750,000, had
invested about one-fourth of it in real estate, and the balance in the securi-
ties of the United States. Held, that the bank was properly taxed, under the
state law, on the whole amount of its original capital. Ard. 1
21. The act in question does not conflict with the constitution of the state,
or of the United States. Id.
22. Power of states indirectly to tax United States securities. Note to
People vs. Commissioners of Taxes, 558.
HL Interference with State Laws.
23. A license under Act of 1862, o. 119, does not'authorize the sale of liquors
in violation of a state law. Commionwealth vs. Thornily, 373.
IV. Questions concerning the Executive. See infra, V.; MANDAmus, 7.
24. The governor of a state cannot be coerced by mandamus to perform an
official duty. People ex rel. Harless vs. Secretary of State, 314.
25. The constitution of Illinois allows the Governor the full period of ten
days of twenty-four hours each, excluding Sundays, and not simply ten
legislative days, in which to return bills which he does not approve.' Id.
26. The Secretary of State cannot be called upon to determine whether a
bill is or is not a law. Id.
27. The power of the Governor to adjourn the legislature in case of dis-
agreement between the two houses. Note 2 to People vs. Auditor, sc., 346.
28. Power of courts to review the action. of the executive of a state.
Note 1 to People vs. Auditor, 4tc., 343. '
29. The certificate of the Speaker of a House of Representatives, as to the
attendance of a member of the house, is not conclusive on the Auditor of State.
People ex rel. Harless vs. The Secretary of State, 814.
V. Questions concerning the Legislature. See ante, 27 ; CouRTs, 1; MANDAMus, 3.
30. Where e constitution requires the legislature to keep a journal of its
proceedings, parol evidence of such proceedings cannot, it seems, be admitted.
People ex rel. Harless vs. Secretary of State, 314..
31. If the members of a legislature disperse and abandon the capital, it is
a practical "adjournment" of the body, though no entry thereof is made
upon the journals. Id.
32. If the executive makes an order for the adjournment of a legislature
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without the happening of the contingency which would authorize such order,
yet if it is acquiesced in and the members accordingly disperse, the session
is terminated notwithstanding the order may be illegal. People vs. Secretary
of State, 814.
83. After a session is terminated in any mode it cannot be resumed at a
future day at a time not fixed by law, without a previous vote of the two
houses or by due proclamation by the governor, unless, perhaps, in case where
the body is dispersed by sudden insurrection or external force. Id.
34. The conclusiveness of legislative journals as to legislative proceedings.
Note I to People vs. Auditor, &c., 8.
85. If the Constitution provide for the adjournment of the legislature by the
Governor, in case of a disagreement between the two houses as to the time of
adjournment, and the Governor, claiming that the contingency has arisen, by
proclamation declares the houses adjourned, and the latter acquiesce in that
act, abandon the capital, draw their pay, and return to their homes, such ac-
quiescence and dispbrsion constitute an adjournment of the legislature in fact,
whether the act of the Governor was rightful or wrongful; and the members
cannot resume their session, unless legally convoked again by the Governor.
People ex rel. Keyes vs. Auditor, 832.
86. When the legislative and executive branches of the government, by the
adoption of an act, give a construction to the constitution, if the construction
thus given is only doubtful, the courts will not hold the act void. Id.
37. The power of a legislature to enforce the attendance of absent members
is plenary, and, may, if necessary, be enforced by posse civiotis. Id.
38. The Constitution as applied to the legislative department of the govern-
ment is a restriction and not a grant of power: and it is competent for the
legislature to prescribe'the qualifications of electors and the time, place, and
manner of exercising the elective franchise, when not expressly prohibited
from so doing, or where the prohibition is not implied from some express
provision of the Constitution. Horrison vs. Springer, 27&.
89. The Constitution of Iowa does not prescribe the place of exercising the
elective franchise, that is left with the legislature. Hence an act allowing
electors in the military service to vote out of the state is constitutional. Id.
40. The Supreme Court will declare a law unconstitutional only when it is
clearly, palpably, and plainly inconsistent with the provisions of that in-
strument. Id.
VI. Obligation of Cont-acts.
41. A state legislature may constitutionally pass an act that if a defendant
is in the actual military service of the United States, any action against him
iii the courts of such state, shall stand continued during the period of his
40tual service. McCormick vs. Busch, 93.
42. An act which interposes such obstacles to the enforcement of certain
mortgages, as to leave the creditor without substantial remedy, impairs the
obligation of contract.s and is void. Oatman vs. Bond, 377.
43. Legislature cannot prohibit a city from levying a tax sufficient to pay
judgments against the city. Wisconsin vs. Madison, 377.
44. Distinction between statutes that impair the obligation of contracts, and
those which operate on remedy only, discussed. Note to McCormick vs. Rusch, 93.
VII. Trial by Jury.
45. An act requiring the reference of all actions of a particular kind to an
individual to take testimony, is unconstitutional. Oatman vs. Bond, 877.
VIII. Taking Private Property without Compensation. 0
46. An act authorizing proprietors of a mill-dam to flow lands of other
persons, without any provision for compensation, except as ascertained by
verdict in an action of trespass, is unconstitutional. Newse'l vs. Smith, 378.
47. A purchaser of land so flowed, for which no compensation has been
made, may recover for the maintenance of the dam after his purchase. Id.
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CONTRACT.- See BAcK, 1; COVENANT ; LIEN, 1; LIITATIoN, 1, 2; RAILROAD,
4; VENDOR.
L Interpretation and Construction.
1. Representations and statements. Behn vs. Burness, 442.
2. In an action where the question at issue relates solely to the effect of the
transaction at the place where it was entered into, the liability of the defend-
ant is to be determined by the lex loci contractus. Scott vs. Pilkington, 442.
8. The Statute of Frauds does not require a promise to be in writing when
it is in effect to pay the promissor's own debt, though in form it is a guarantee
of that of another person. Mfalone vs. Keener, 312.
4. Subscription paper to pay to Treasurer-failure to elect on the day
appointed. • Wayne, 4-c., Institute vs. Greenwood, 190.
5. One who advertises a reward for information is liable at common law,
and the Statute of Frauds does not apply. Williams vs: Byrnes, 627.
6. Parties engaging an inventor to perfect a machine, have no claim for
improvements conceived by him after expiration of the contract. Appleton
vs. Bacon, 54.
7. An agreement to "cancel" an indebtedness is an agreement to pay it.
Auburn City Bank vs. Leonard, 254.
8. To put a party in command of a boat does not include keeping him
there. McKee vs. Kinney, 684.
IL Consideration.
9. Service in procuring legislation by personal influence not a legal con-
sideration. Frost vs. Belmont, 874.
10. Mutual subscriptions of money to be paid to a trustee for some coiA-
mon object are a legal consi leration. Underwood vs. Waldron, 183.
I. Performance.
11. Where the subject-matter is destroyed before the time for performing
the agreement, the parties are discharged from the contract. Taylor vs. Cald-
well, 442.
12. One ivho has agreed to build a house upon the land of. another, but
before he has completed it, it is destroyed by fire, is liable to an action for
money advanced on the contract, and damages for its breach. Tompkins vs.
Dudley et al., 56.
13. Action under contract to build-recoupment for failure to complete in
time. Wagner vs. Corkhill, 319.
14. An employee dismissed before his time expires is prima facie entitled to
recover for the whole time. King et al. vs. Steiren, 310.
15. Defendant may give evidence in mitigation of damages. Id.
16. Under a contract for wages to continue one year notwithstanding the
death of the employer, reasonable services are due to the latter's executors.
,purdett vs. Yale et al., 249.
* 17. Compensation under special contract where the employee dies, is to be
measured by the contract. Clark vs. Gilbert, 699.
18. Specific performance decreed where party had failed in his part of con-
tract on account of mistake. Todd vs. Taft, 697.
IV. In Restraint of Trade.
19. A limit of two hundred miles may not be unreasonable. Harms vs.
.Parsons, 627.
20. Soliciting orders for another not a breach. Clark vs. Watkins, 627.
2L Nor lending money to a person in the trade in question, on mortgage
of his trade-premises. Bird vs. Lake, 627.
22. Nor fitting up houses and selling them for the purposes of such trade. Id.
V. arol Evidence to affect Written. See BILLs, 10; INSURANCE, 12, 17.
23. A warranty that a machine shall be cipable with "a good team" of
cutting a certain amount of grain, contains a patent ambiguity, yet it may be
explained by parol evidence. Ganson vs. Madigan, 508.
24.- Auburn City Bank vs. Leonard, 254.
25. Bloomer vs. Millinger, 695.
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CONTRACTOR. See NEGLIGENCE, 1-5.
CONTRIBUTION. See MORTGAGE, 8, 15, 16.
CONVERSION. See DECEDENT, 1; INsuRANCE, 29; TENAKT IN COMmoN; Tnovxn.
COPYRIGHT.
1. A bookseller's sale catalogue containing original descriptive annotati..s
is a proper subject of copyright. Rotten vs. Arthur, 306.
2. Copy of picture by photography is infringement. Gambart vs. Tall, F21.
-. Publication of drama containing scenes of a novel wpied verbatim e
irfringement. Tinsley vs. Lacy, 628.
4. Injunction granted without proof of actual damage. Id.
CORONER.
Not liable for words spoken by him to his jury. Tomm -s. CA.&r. , ,P
CORPORATION. See MORTGAGE, 2640; MUNICIPAL CORPORAUJ 1; A.4 Y J .ABLI
BONDS; PARTNEnSHIP, 4; RAILROAD.
L 2cit and Powers.
1. A corporation has power to mortgage its franchises Wit.i 1'. uther pro-
perty, to secure its liabilities. Mforrill et al. vs. -Noyes, 18.
2. The directors of a company having directed a claim to b'e transferred to
certain persons by the "proper officers," it was presumed !nA. such officers
were the president and secretary. Carroll vs. Cone, 319.
8. An insti'ument to be the deed of a corporation must be sealed with the
corporation seal and by the proper officer. Burden of proof us to the sealing.
Koeh er vs. Black River (o., 55.
II. Directors and Stockholders.
4. The officers and directors of a corporate body are trustees of the stock-
holders, and in securing to themselves an advantage not common to all the
stockholders, they commit a; plain breach of duty. Koehler vs. Black River
Falls Iron Co., 66.
5. A minority of the stockholders of a corporation may maintain a bill in
equity against it, on behalf of themselves and the others, for conspiracy and
fraud. Peabody vs. Flint et al., 120.
6. Personal liability of directors of insolvent corporation. Seymour vs.
Sturges, 498.
I. Receiver.
7. A receiver is so far under the protection of a court of equity, that the
property in the possession of the company which he has obtained the charge
of, under his commission, will be deemed "pendente lite" to be rightfully in
his possession, and trover will not lie for the same. Morrill vs. Noyes, 18.
8. The claim for dividends improperly declared by an insolvent banking
corporation, belongs to creditors, and not to the receiver, and the right of
action is in them. Butterworth vs. O'gBrien, 60.
IV.
9. Liability of subscribers to stock. Seymour vs. Sturgess, 498.
10. New York Act of 1845, in relation to suits against a foreign. Id.
COUNSEL.
1. Party is liable for services of senior counsel Brigham vs. Foster, 698.
2. How fees may be estimated in special cases. Frost vs. Belmont, 374.
COURTS. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, L, 28, 36, 40; MonTGAGE, 25.
L Courts in general.
1. Have no power to compel the legislature to execute a trust of municipal
not fiducial character. Supervisors vs. Burchell, 631.
2. Judgment of a foreign court conclusiie on the merits. Lazier vs. West.
Cott, 501.
3. Courts will take judicial notice of the existence and authority of officers
of a colonial government without certification by the imperial authorities. rd.
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4. A transaction valid by the decisions of the court at the time, will not be
invalidated by the courts subsequent overruling of its decisions. Gel cke vs.
.Dubugue, 629.
5. Where a statute authorizes any person in possession of real property, to
institute a suit against one who claims an adverse interest therein, the judg-
ment of a court in such suit is conclusive on title of both parties. Lessee of
"- Parrih vs. Ferris, 54.
6. Finding of facts by Supreme Court of New York and review by the Ceurt
of Appeals. Phelps vs, McDonald, 600.
7. Judgment of Oyer and Terminer-Review in Court of Appeals-how the
writ of error should be addressed. Hartung vs. The People, 500.
I Courts of the United Statee.
8. The Supreme Court of the United States will not necessarily follow the
latest decisions of state courts on the law of their own states. Gelpeke vs.
Dubuque. 629.
9. Power of the Supreme Court of the United States to revise, the proceed-
ings of the Circuit Court, is confined to the questions stated in the certificate.
Ward et al. vs. Chamberlain et al., 53. 1 " I
10. Judgments of the courts of the United States are liens in all cases where
those of state courts in similar cases are. Id.
I. State Courts.
11, The courts of the several states are foreign courts as to 'each other
Smith et al. vs. Lathrop et at., 107.
. 12. State courts have no power to issue a writ of habeas corpus, or to
continue proceedings under it when issued, in cases of commitment ordetain-
" er under the authority of the- United States. Matter of Ho~pon, 189.
13. A controversy in which no right is claimed under the Constitution or
laws of the. United States is exclusively within the jurisdiction ,of 'the state
courts. Congdon et al. vs.Goodman, 54.
14. The legal-presumption is in favor of thejurisdidction of-a court of record
of another state, which has assumed to exercise it. Buffum vs, .8timp on, 64.
16. Where bonds and coupons made in Ohio are payable inlNew York, the
courts of New York will havejurisdictidn of an action on the bonds, though
both parties are foreign corporations. Connecticut Ins. Co. vs. Cleveland, Ik.,
Railroad Co., 443.
COVENANT. See ESTATE, 8; ESTOPPEL, 8; RELEASE, 1. "
1. Where a trust estate is sold in plots for building, with restrictive cove-
nants,. each purchaser has an equity against the other to enforce the cove-
nants. Eastwood vs. Leaver, 693.
2. Such equity may be lost by acquiescence. Id.
3. Parties to suit to enforce such equity. Id.
4. To use a house as dwelling only. Wilkinson vs. Roger$, 692.
5. Breach of such covenant. Id.
6. Not to let house as a hotel. .Tayv vs. Richardson, 692.
7. To bequeath money not satisfied, by ' bequest in will. Graham va.
Wickham, 628.
8. Nor by appointment under a power to appoint to children. Id.
CRIMINAL LAW. See Couurs, 7.
I. Confessions.
1. Confessions made .after conversations advising a confession, and not
ezpres8ly promising to prevent a prosecution, admissible in evidence. Vosn
monwealth vs. Lckerman, 184.
IL .Bawdy House.
2. Evidence in-indiotmeft for keeping. Harwood vs. The People, 499.
I. .Burglary.
8. Indictmeni for breaking with intent, &c., need not state what kind of
felony was intended., .Mason vs. The People, 499
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4. In tenement house the door of each room or suite is an outer door.
Mason vs. The People, 499.
IV. Embeicent.
5. Money of a corporation received by treasurer, and deposited in bank, to
his credit as such, is the property of the corporation, and if he converts it to
his use it is embezzlement. Commonwealth vs. ITuckerman, 184.
6. Admission of evidence of other similar acts to show intent. Id.
V. Forgery.
7. A certified check is an entire instrument, and an indictment need not
specify that the forgery was of the certification. People vs. Ciementg, 569.
8. Altering signature on party's own check to defraud bank, is not.
Brittain vs. Bank of London, 693.
9. False entry in banker's pass-book. Beg. vs. Smith, 693.
VL Larceny.
10. Taking of money given for purpose of having a ticket procured. Beg
vs Thompson, 69a.
11. Detaining cheek from the finder. Beg. vs. Gardner, 693.
VII. Murder.
12. Sufficiency of averment. Evani vs. People, 184.
VIII. Potygamy.
18. Burden of proof of divorce as defence to indictment for second mar!4
riage is on defendant. Corn. vs. Boyer, 668.
IX. Seduction.
14. Evidence in action for. Enyon vs. The People, 56.
(,URRENCY.
Means bank bills, &c., which pass as and for coin. SpringfielK Itc., I,.
Co. vs. Tcher et at, 312.
DAMAGES. See ErLrs AND NoTEs, 25, 80; COMMON CARRIER, 7; CONTRAOT, 15,
17 ; FALSE IMPRISONMENT, 1; INSURANCE, 14, 29; NEGLIG.NCE, 8; RAIL-
ROAD, 9, 12; SgHumn , 4; TnovER, 2, 3.
In an action for wilfully injuring a mine, the measure of damages Is the
actual injury by delay, loss of time, &c., but not merely speculative profits.
McKnight vs. Batclif, 311.
DEBT. See GROUND-RENT, 1.
No defence that the debt arose from receipt of worthless bills, where de-
fendant did not suffer from them. Orchard vs. Hughes, 694.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR. See CoRPoRATIoN, 8; DEED, 1, 3; HUSBAND AND WIFE,
24, 25; IssoavEsc, 1-3; INsuRANo, 1, 2; MORTGAGE, 2, 6; PAuTNEsnIp, 2.
DECEDENT'S ESTATE. See INSURANCE, 27, 28; WILL.
1. Direction to sell land, convert it into money, and invest it till the time
fixed for distribution, is an equitable conversion into personalty. Johnson
vs. Bennett, 123.
2. Purchase by agent of administrator at sale of decedent's real estate, is
void. Forbes vs. Halsey, 600.
3. Evidence to give a surrogate jurisdiction to order sale of real estate of
decedent. Id.
DEED. See CORPORATION, 3; EQUITY, 5; IUsAND AND WIFE, 18; STAMP;
TENANT IN COMMON, 3.
1. A money consideration recited in a deed is prima fadce the true one, but
a judgment-creditor may rebut the presumption. Amsden vs. Manchester, 818.
2. Marriage is good consideration. Smith vs. Allen, 63.
8. Creditor cannot contest validity of conveyance by his debtor in an action
by grantee for trespass by execution against the land. Garbutt vs. Smith, 188.
4. Grantee takes according to his deed, not by a map of a tract out of which
he buys a lot. Perrin vs. N. Y. C. R. R. Co., 189.
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5. Unrecorded is void against a subsequent recorded deed, even in equity.
.Tohnson vs. Crane et al., 254.
6. Condition subsequent. Rawson vs. School District, 507.
7. Ratification of deed made during insanity. Bond vs. Bond, 5(r.
8. Equity will not compel grantor to seal a voluntary deed. Eaton vs.
Eaton, 609.
9. The production of a fraudulent certificate of approval of a land grant,
affords strong ground for believing all the title papers to be fabricated.
United States vs. Galbraith, 51.
10. The court will not confirm a title where the date of the grant has beez.
altered while in the hands of the claimants. Id.
DOMICIL, 257.
DURESS. See HUsBAND A" Wnm, 85.
1 In an action to recover money paid under duress, plaintiff must state facts.
Commercial Bank vs. Rochester, 689.
DWELLING. See CovzANiT, 4.
What is not a conversion into a shop. Wilkinson vs. .Rogers, 692.
EASEMENT. See WATEncouRss; WAY.
Nothing basses as incident to the grant of an easement but that which is
necessary for its reasonable enjoyment. Bean vs. Coleman, 381.
ELECTION. See COdNSTITUTIOxri LAw, 88, 89.'
Required by statute to be held, is not affected by want of notice. People
vs. Bartwell, 764.
EQUITY. See AccouNT RzKDEu, 2; BILLS, 18; DEED, 5, S; FRAUD; MoRT-
GAGE, 16-18, 28, 81.
1. Although equity will, in some cases, interfere to assert and protect
future rights, yet it will not decree in thesi as to 'the future rights of parties
not before the court or in esse. Cross vs. De Valle, 630.
2. Jurisdiction in cases of private nuisance. Burnham vs. Kempton, 380.
3. Injunction .will be granted where the injury would be irreparable.
Hitagara Bridge Co. vs. G. W'. R. R. Co., 122.
4. Jurisdiction to compel restitution of money improperly paid by officers
of a town. Frost vs. Belmont, 874.
5. A bill lies to set aside a deed procured by fraud. Martin vs. Graves, 62.
6. Amendment after demurrer where there is laches. Bank vs. Steven-
son, 697.
7. Rehearing on ground of newly discovered evidence. Dennet vs. Den-
nett, 125.
8. When a bill dismissed is a bar to subsequent bill. Borrowcale vs. Tut-
tle, 62.
9. What may be included in the defence of want of equity. Burnhain
vs. Kempton, 380.
ERROR. See ADMIRALTY, 6; C ouRTs, 7.
1. A verdict will not be set aside for inconsistent charges to the jury, irAll
those excepted to by the complaining party are correct. Niagara Insurance
Co. vs. Graf, 489.
2. Where proof of a payment is erroneously rejected, the remission of the
amount after verdict will not cure the error. Hanson vs. Olcott, 765.
3. Where a question put to his own witness was improperly overruled. lihe
error was not cured by the party afterwards obtaining an answer to the
same question on the cross-examination of a witness of the opposite party
Flanigan vs. Lamyman, 183.
4. Judgment on a verdict of guilty on one count, will not be reversed for
want of finding of the jury on another count. Edgerton vs. Commonwealrh, 62
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ESTATE. See DECEDENT, 1; ExEcUTIoN, 1; INsURANcE. 29; WIL, 8-12.
1. In New York, when land is granted to A. for life and then to his heire,
the persons who, at the termination of the life estate, are the heirs of A., take
as purchasers and not by descent. Moore vs. Littel. 144.
2. The remainder so limited is contingent, and the heirs apparent of the
tenant for life have a future contingent estate, which, under the Statute of New
York, will pass by their grant of the land in fee. Id.
3. The child of an heir apparent whose mother dies before her ancestor, will
not in such case be estopped by covenants of warranty in her mother's deed. Id.
ES) OPPEL. See ESTATE, 3; ExzcuTioN, 2; HOMESTEAD, 1; SHERIFF, 1; SURETY,
4; TRUST, &
1. Erroneous information given by holder of security as to the title of a
debtor in the property, will not work an estoppel in pai, unless he intended to
deceive the creditor seeking information, nor unless the latter was led thereby
to change his action, and was the'reby injured. Piper vs. Gilmore, 584.
2. Growth of the law relating to. Note to Piper vs. Gilmore, 590.
3. The doctrine of estoppel by covenants of warranty discussed. Note to
Moore vs. Litte, 149.
EVIDENCE. See BOUNDARY, 1; CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, 80, 34; CONTRACT, V.;
COURTS, 3; CRIMINAL LAW, 1, 2, 6, 14; EQuiTY, 7; HUSBAND AND WIFE,
20, 21 ; INSURANCE, 6, 12, 17, 80.
1. VERBAL DECLARATIONS OP DECEASED PERSONS, 641.
2. Of expert, admissible to prove a machine not constructed in workmanlike
manner, without proof of particular defects. Curtis vs. Gano, 635.
3. Of experts. Emerson vs. Lowell Gaslight Co., 261.
4. Plaintiff's declarations. Id.
5. Parol evidence is admissible to show that a paper produced on trial is
not the genuine paper called for. - Gilmore vs. Whiitcher, 251.
EXECUTION. See DEED, 3; MORTGAGE, 24; SusRIn?.
1. Where the use and occupancy of land was devised to one during his
natural life, and a creditor levied upon his estate, and had it set off by appraisal
of his whole interest, the levy was good. McClure vs. Aflendy, 126.
2. Creditor purchasing subject to mortgageat sale on prior execution cannot
dispute validity of mortgage. Horonvs. Da, 700.
EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR. See DaoEDzNT'S ESTATE, 2; Insu.toE,
28.
1. Not personally liable for innocently receiving usury on a note due testa-
tor. Heath vs. Cook, 507.. 2. Executor procuring lease of premises held by testator but forfeited, will
hold as trustee. Lich vs. Bernicker, 633.
3. In New York, before granting letters, there must be a writtenrenunciation
or a citation to the person having a prior'right Barber vs. Converse, 875.
4. An ordinary action does not lie in New York against a foreign executor
as such. Metcalfvs. Clark, 502.
5. Proceedings by attachment are inapplicable against an executor not
charged with breach of duty except neglect to pay a debt of testator. Id.
FALSE IMPRISONMENT.
1. Measure of damages for. Brown vs. Chadrey, 61.
2. Private person taking part in an unlawful imprisonment by an officer,
is liable for the trespass, but not if he merely gives information to the officer.
Brown vs. Cladrey, 123.
8. Justification must be specially pleaded under New York Code. rd.
FARM MORTGAGES. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 42.
FENCE. See LIMITATION, 8.
1. There may be a valid prescription binding the owner of land to maintain
perpetually a fence. Adams vs. Van Alstyne, 58.
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2. In such a case, fence-,iewers have no jurisdiction. Adams vs. Van
Altyne, 58.
8. Maintenance by a party exclusively for more than 20 years, warrants
the presumption of a covenant compelling him to do so. rd.
FRAUD. See AGENT, 4, 6, 7 ; DEED, 9, 10; EQUITY, 5; STATUTz OF FRAUDS.
1. To exclude a party from relief against another engaged in the same
fraud, he must be not only in ddicto but in pari delicto. Freelove vs. Colej 638.
2. Where the owner of mortgaged land made a "friendly arrangement"
with the mortgagee to buy in the land, ostensibly for his own use, but in
reality to hold it for the use of the mortgagor, in order to defeat the claim of
a third person, he cannot sustain a bill in equity to restrain mortgagee from
selling the land. Randal vs. Howard, 55.
3. In actions involving questions of fraud, the intent is always a material
inquiry: and to establish that. other acts of a similar character, done about
the same time, may always be shown. Amsden vs. Manchester, 818.
FUTURE ACQUISITIONS. See BILLs, 24.
A power to seize future chattels is not an assignment of them. Reeve Ts.
W, itmore, 489.
GAMING.
Maney Won at play canot be recovered back. Weish vs. Cutter, 127.
GOVERNOR. See CoN5T TIONA LAW, IV.; MAmDAmus, 7.
GROUND-RENT.
1. The sum to be paid for the extinguishment of ground-rent is not an
estate, but a debt when the owner of the land has elected to pay it. e Um-
berger vs. Brinton, 591.
2. Therefore where a ground-rent is payable in "lawful 0ilver money of the
United States," and there is a clause of extinguishment on the payment of a
certain sum "lawful money,- as aforesaid," the latter is payable in legal
tender notes of thp United States. Id.
HABEAS CORPUS. See CouRTS, 12.
Exceptions do -not lie to the discharge of a prisoner on Aabee corpas by a
single judge. Wyeth vs. Ricardson, 185.
HIGHWAY. See LImTATION, 8; SmzAx.
Commissioners must lay out the whole, as applied for, or none. Pewpe vs.
Township Board, 4, 765.
HOMESTEAD. See MOxToAOu, 21.
1. Covenants of warranty in a deed of land, do not estop the grantor from
availing himself of an estate of homestead therein. Doyle vs. Coburn, 121.
2. An estate of homesiead is not defeated by the removal of the wife and
children from the premises, if the householder continues to reside thereon.
Id.
HUSBAND AND WIFE. See DuD, 2.
L Marriage, Divorce, and Alimony.
1. LAws REGULATING TnE Foitms Or MARRIAGE IN THS URITZD -STArRI, -129.
2. CONrLxCT OF LAws ATECT IO MAnsL~Os AND Drvoxoz, 198..
8. VALIDITY AND EFFzCT Or FoaiON Dzvoitos, 193.
4. In an action by a husband on ground of adultery, the wife cannot set
up the adultery of plaintiff by way of counter claim. R. .. vs. S. I., 188.
5. Proof of adultery alone will not authorize a judgment of divorce. It
must be averred to have been without the consent, connivance, privity, or
procurement of the plaintiff. M yers vs. Myers, 504.
6. It is the duty of a referee in such case to find not only the facts as to




7. Opening of decree for alimony for matters occurring at or before the
decree. Perkins vs. Perkins, 764.
It, Curtesy and Dower.
8. The birth of living children, after the conveyance by a married woman
of land held by her to her separate use, will entitle her husband to curtesy
therein. Comer vs. Chamberlain, 317.
9. Where H. received a deed and at the same time reconveyed the land in
mortgage to his grantor, the wife of H. was not entitled to dower as against
such mortgage. Hinds vs. Ballou, 126.
10. Widow dowable of lands to which husband had an inchoate title, and to
extent of dower she is representative of the claimants. Thomas vs. Hesse, 632.
11. If husband sell without wife's relinquishment of dower, she is dowable
according to the law in force at the time of sale. Id.
12. If alienees hold such land in several parcels, dower will be assigned in
each separately. d.
ILL Separate Estate of Wife. See UsurY, 6.
13. A married woman can charge the whole or a portion of her separate
estate as a surety for her husband, the intention to charge such separate
estate being declared in the contract. .Barnett vs. .Lichtenstein, 61.
14. Wife cannot charge her separate estate by parol promise to pay a debt
of the husband, where her estate is to receive no benefit. Ledlie vs. Yrooman,
604.
15. Application of separate estate to maintenance of insane wife. Daven-
port vs. Davenport, 63.
16. Married woman is liable on a note given by her to pay for land for her
separate estate. Chapman vs. Foster, 317.
17. Policy of insurance to wife cannot be transferred so as to divest her
interest. Eadie vs. S1immon, 568.
18. Acknowledgment it seems is not necessary in New York to conveyance
of wife's separate estate. Wiles vs. Peck, 568.
19. Trust funds of wife lent to husband on his note and by agreement no
interest collected, the statute of limitations does not apply. Upham vs.
Wyman, 699.
20. Settlement by husband on wife-when it will be valid-presumptions
and evidence in relation to. Townsend vs. Maynard, 572.
21. Husband's declarations not admissible to prove property in wife.
.Parvin vs. Capewell, 575.
22. Possession of money by wife no evidence of her separate right to it.
.d.
23. Mere gift to wife by husband not a settlement to her separate use. Id.
24. Rent of real estate bought by married woman cannot be attached by
creditor of the husband. Goff vs. ifuttall et al., 309.
25. In trespass for taking property of a firm of which the wife was a mem-
ber for husband's debt, she must show that her interest was her separate
estate. Duress vs. Homeffer, 509.
IV. Powers and Liabilities of Married Women. See Usuny, 6.
26. Where goods are sold to a married woman upon her individual credit,
although the vendors are ignorant of the fact of coverture, there is no lia-
bility ez contractu on the part of the husband to pay for them. Goulding vs.
Davidson, 34.
27. But if the credit to the wife was obtained by fraudulent representations
on her part that she was unmarried, the vendor may have an action against
the husband and wife jointly, either to recover the goods, or damages for
their conversion; or semble, an action on the case for damages for the fraud
Id.
28. For tort of the wife committed in the presence or by order of the hus-
band, the latter alone is liable, and after his death no action survives against
the Wife for such tort. Id.
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29. But if the tort was not in the husband's presence or by his order, it is
the wrong of the wife although the husband is jointly liable with her, and in
such case an action will survive against the wife alone after the death of the
husband. Goulding vs. Davidon, 84.
30. Therefore, where goods had been sold to a married woman on her repre-
sentations that she was sole, and she had given notes in payment, her promise
made after the death of her husband to pay the notes was founded on a good
and sufficient consideration. rd.
81. Whether married woman is liable civilly when she fraudulently repre-
sents herself as sole. Note to Goulding vs. Davidson, 42.
32. Whether in such case she is bound by subsequent promise, after hus-
band's death. Id.
83. Purchase-money is a lien on the land sold, where the purchaser has
given no separate security, and this applies to purchases by married women.
Chilton vs. Braidea's-Adm., 53.8 4. A married woman may belong to a trading partnership, if her husband
is not a member thereof. Plumer vs. Lord, 68.
85. Coercion of wife by threat of prosecuting husband. Eadi vs. Shmmox,
568.
V. Actions by Husband and Wif.•
86. Undir a statute providing that the separate property.of a married wo-
man shall remain under her sole control, &c., a married woman, as to her sepa-
rate property, is in the condition of a few sole, and may bring an action at law
in her own name, without joining her husband. Bmerson vs. Clayton, 580.
87. Actions under statutes providing for wife's separate estate. Note to
Emerson vs. Clayton, 583.
88. Married woman may, in New York, maintain an action in her own
name, and counter claims against thetrsband will not be allowed. Paine vs.
Hunt,* 252..
89. In a suit by husband and wife, for the loss of merchandise of the wife
before marriage, she is not a competent witness for the plaintiffs. Smith and
Wfe vs. Boston and Maine Railroad, 127.
INCOME TAX. See'BAmKs, 8.
A testator directed an annuity to be paid out of his personal estate ,, with-
out any deduction whatever:" If eld, that the income tax was payable by the
annuitant. .Abadam vs. Abadam 690.
INFANT. See RAmnoAn, 8.
INNKEEPER.
Party hiring room for a ball are not "guests," so as to make innkeeper liable
for loss of their property. Hobbs vs. Carter, 188.
INSANITY. See DEED, 7; HUSBAND AND WiM, 15; MuML. UNSOUiDNS8s;
Sziqxr DExENmI.
INSOLVENCY. See ConpoRATiow, 8; PAnTraxuSniP, 2, 8, 5, 6, 9; VxNDOB, 2.
1. A discharge under the insolvent laws of one state will not dischaige a
debt to a citizen of another state, unless the latter has voluntarily become a
party to the proceedings, and thus given the court jurisdiction. Baldwin vs.
Bale, 462.
2. Nature and effect of a discharge under a state insolvent law. Note to
Baldwin vs. Hate, 469.
8. Attachment by creditor of an insolvent's property in another state. Do-
hon vs. Foster, 506.
4 New promise to pay made before discharge is valid. Lerow vs. Wit-
mar h, 698.
6. Plea of discharge. Haggerty vs. Amory, 698.
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L Insurable Interest.
1. Where a creditor of F. bad insured his life for a sum not exceeding his
debt, and before F.'s death, action upon the debt was barred by the Statute
of Limitations, the insured was entitled to recover from the company. Rawls
vs. Anmerican Ins. Co., 167.
2. In such a case the debt still exists, and is not extinguished, as in the
case of payment. Id.
3. In life insurance it is enough that the party effecting the policy has an
insurable interest at its inception. Id.
4. The rules. of the defendant required the applicant for insurance to fur-
nish a reference to some third person, from whom information might be ob-
tained respecting the health and habits of the person whose life was to be
insured: Held, that the statement of the third person was not a warranty.
Id.
6. Where a series of questions is put to the insured, and fully answered,
an omission to state matter not called for by any general or specific question,
is not a concealment. Id.
6. The following propositions, among others, in the law of evidence, de-
cided:
a. Statements by the debtor made after the insurance is- effected are not
admissible in evidence against the insured.
b. Experts cannot be examined as to the point whether a person who is in
the habitual use of intoxicating drinks can be regarded as an insurable sub-
ject.
c. When the defendant puts in issue in the pleadings, the good faith of the
author of a written statement upbn which the policy is issued, it is proper
for the plaintiff to ask such person if his answers to questions contained in
the statement were made in good faith. Id.
7. The rule of the common law as to the right to insure, where the insured
has no interest, discussed. Note to Rawls vs. Insurance Co., 178.
8. Whether life insurance is a contract of indemnity, discussed. Id.
9. If one partner insures in his own name only, and there is no evidence
to show that the insurance was for the partnership, or that the premium was
paid from the partnership funds, the policy will be held to cover his undivided
interest only. Insurance Co. vs. Hall, 417.
1 10. One partner cannot, in his own name, and for his own benefit, insure
the interest of his copartner, even though such may have been the intention
of both the insurer and insured. Id.
. 11. By consignee or commission merchant in his own name. Note to
Insurance Co. vs Loney. 662.
12. Parol evidence to affect the language of a pblicy. Id.
11. Construction of Policy.
13. A building was insured for $8000 by A., and $2000 by B., in separate
policies, each of which contained a clause allowing the insurer the option of
rebuilding, and the building having been destroyed by fire, A. and B. served
a joint notice that they were prepared to rebuild. The building having been
reconstructed, the insured insisted that the contract had not been substantially
complied with, and brought an action on the policy against A., claiming to
recover the full amount of his original loss: Held, that he could not recover.
Iorrell vs. Ins. Co., 404.
14. After the election and notice, a contract to rebuild existed between the
parties, and if this is not fulfilled by the insurer, he is liable for the damages
sustained by the non-fulfilment of the contract, which may be more or less
than the amount insured. The action, consequently, should have been
brought to recover damages for breach of contract. Id.
15 It seems that the action might have been brought against both insurers
jointly or either separately. Id.
16 Effect of an election by company to rebuild under the clause in th.
policy giving them that right. Note to fforrell vs. Ins. Co., 414,
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17. A policy of insurance containing a clause that goods held on commis-
sion must be insured as such, is to be interpreted by its own terms, and parol
evidence is not admissible to show that. the insurers knew the kind of busi-
ness of the insured, and the character of his interest in the goods. Baltimore
Ins. Co. vs. Loney, 651.
18. There was an insurance by appellant upon goods of class A. (the
appellees' own goods merely), and insurance by another company on goods
of classes A. and B. indiscriminately (class B. being goods held on commis-
sion). The appellant's policy contained a coveltaut that no greater propor-
tion of a loss should be recovered under it than the amount thereby insured
should bear to the whole amount of all the insurances on the premises. The
loss on goods of class B. alone, was greater than the second company's entire
insurance, and it accordingly paid the full amount without reference to the
classes of goods: Held, that the second insurance was not within the effect
of the covenant for proportion, and that the appellant was not entitled to any
abatement of its liability by reason thereof. Id.
19. The policy contained a clause that the loss should be paid within sixty
days after it should be ascertained and proved. The loss was duly proved
within the sixty days, and was acknowledged by the company, who offered
payment of what it assumed as the amount of its liability (but in fact a smaller
sum than it was bound for), and then refused to pay any larger sum: Beld,
that thereby the condition as to the sixty days was waived, and interest was
due from that date on the sum for which the company was really bound. rd.
20. A policy of insurance contained a clause that no action should be
brought upon it unless within twelve months after the loss had occurred.
Such a limitation must rest upon the tacit condition that the insurer should
be accessible to the service of process. Am. Co. vs. Hall, 417.
21. A condition that if gunpowder was kept without written permission in
the policy, the policy should be void, is not broken if the agent at the time
of taking the insurance knew that gunpowder was kept. Id.
22. Notice to the agent was notice to the insurer; and by issuing the
policy the latter waived the condition. Id.
23 Liquors, the sale of which is prohibited under a penalty, may still be
insured. Niagara Ins. Co. vs. De Graff, 489.
24. Goods were insured as -,groceries." The stock included spirituous
liquors kept for dale. A loss occurred, and an action being brought on the
policy, the insurer asked the court to charge that, since the Prohibitory
Liquor Law, the term " groceries" would not include liquors. The question
whether the liquors were insured under this term was properly left: to the
jury. Id.
25. A policy of insurance on "groceries" had a condition that if the pre-
mises were used for storing liquors, "except as herein specially provided for,
or hereafter agreed to by this corporation, in writing upon this policy," the
policy should thereby be rendered of no effect. Liquors were kept, and It
was held that if the jury found that the term "groceries," as used, included
these articles, then they were ,specially provided for in writing on the
policy." Id.
26. An agreement to insure for the benefit of a vend* and to assign policy
for his security, with subsequent insurance and no assignment, operates as
equitable assignment of money payable upon the policy in case of loss, but
not of policy, and therefore not within clause declaring the interest of ingured
is not assignable without written consent. Cromwell vs. Brooklyn Fire iJn.
Co., 128.
27. Interest in a policy on realty descends to heirs. Wyran vs. Wyman,
569.
28. If policy runs to assured, his executos; &o., the latter'may maintain
an action as trustee for the heirs. rd.
29. Damages in such case are realty. Id.
30. Acknowledgment in policy not conclusive of receipt of premium.
Sheldon vs. Atlantic Ins. Co., 635.
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31. Cases of marine insurance discriminated. Sheldon vs. Ins. Co., 685.
32. A general agent may waive condition that no insurance shall be bind
ing till payment of premium. Id.
83. What will amount to waiver. Id.
84. Clause "partial loss on tin plates excepted." Kettell vs. Alliance Ins.
Co., 186.
35. Insurance on goods contained in a store, wall of the building fell, and
before the goods could be removed fire broke out. Insurers liable for goods
not injured by the fall. Lewis vs. Springqfield Ins. Co., 186.
36. Allowance for advanced premiums. Chesbrough vs. Wright, 444.
III. Marine Insurance.
87. A warranty by the assured that the vessel shall be free from capture,
seizure, or detention, includes. a capture by a cruiser of the so-called Con-
federate-States: Dole vs. New England Ins. Co., 315.
88. In such case the liability of the insurers is terminated by such capture,
so that they are not liable for the burning of the vessel immediately there-
after. Id.
39. Conveyance and reconveyance of vessel by way of mortgage is not
within the terms of a policy against assignment of insured's interest. Hitch-
cock vs. N. W. Ins. Co., 500.
40. Notice of abandonment to support claim for constructive total loss must
state the damage to exceed half the value. Mc~onochie vs. Sun Ins. Co., 701.
41. Implied warranty of seaworthiness in time policy. Home vs. Pacffx
Ins. Co., 507.
IV. Life Insurance. See ante, 1-8.
42. A policy is conditioned to be void in certain events, "except to the
extent of any interest acquired therein by assignment for valuable considera-
tion." The insurer mortgages the policy, together with real estate; after-
wards the policy is avoided under the condition. The society is compelled
by the mortgagee to pay him the policy, and it then files a bill to take his
place as against the other property. Held, that such a claim cannot be sus-
tained. Solicitor's Life Assurance Society vs. Lamb, 686. .
48. The premium on a life insurance policy due on Sunday, is not to be
paid until Monday, even if assured dies on Sunday. Hammond vs. American
Ins. Co., 186.
V. Mutual Insurance Company.
44. May divide its business into classes, but whether it may exempt pre-
minm notes in one class from assessment for losses in another, guwre. Sands
vs. Boutwell, 636.. 45. Receiver may charge in his assessment for expenses of making and
collecting the same. Id.
INTEREST. See BAaN, 7, 10; NEGOTIABLE Boitos, 2, 5; PaTNERSHP, 8;
UsuRY.
1. A purchaser for cash is chargeable in case of non-payment, with interest
from delivery. Foote vs. Blanchard, 250.
2. On a debt due by garnishee to his creditor as whose property it is at-
tached, is suspended during the proceedings. ,Tachton's Er'rs. vs. Lloyd, 809.
8. Interest "till paid" means from date. -Pittman vs. Barrett, 683.
INTERNAL REVENUE.
Character of the office of commissioner. Note- to Mereedy vs. Callahan,
241
INTERNATIONAL LAW. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 8, 9, 16.
JUDGMENT. See CounTs, 2, 5, 7, 10; MORTOAGE, 2; P~nvTi~oN.
1. Cannot be impeached in action upon itfor want of authority of attorney.
Finneran vs. Leonard, 506.
2. The order of court, denying a motion to cancel a judgment, entered upon
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confession, as having been paid, is conclusive between the parties.. Dwigt
vs. St. John, 69.
8. The New York act in respect to authentication of foreign, relates to pro-
vincial as well as imperial governments. Lazier vs. festcott, 501.
4. How an exemplification of such judgment may be proved and received
in evidence. fd.
JUSTICE.
1. Jurisdiction of a cause commences- on the day and hour fixed in the
summons for its return. Bagendorf vs. Shult, 504.
2. When any act is deferred beyond the time limited in the Justice's Act.
by the consent of the parties, it is no error that the actis done after the time
specified in the act, if done within the agreed time. Barnes vs. Badger, 503.
LANDLORD AND TENANT.
1. Construction of lease. Crouch vs. Parker, 253.
2. Lessee of upper story is discharged from payment of rent by destruction
of building-by fire. Graves vs. Berdan, 700.
3. Contra if he has an interes! in the soil Id.
4. Clause that landlord shall pay value of buildings at end of term does not
give tenant a right to hold over until paid. Speer8 vs. Flack, 633.
5. Lease "from the 1st July" begins on 2d; Atkins vs. Sleeper, 698.
6. If the owner of a tenement has obtained. peaceable possession of a part
of it, upon the expiration of his tenant's estate, he mayuse force to take pos-
session of the residue. ffugford and Wife vs. Richardson, 122.
LAW REFORM AND CODIFICATION, 74.
LAW REFORMS AND LAW REFORMERS, 513.
LEGISLATURE. See CONSTITUTIONA3 L&w, V.; CounTs, 1.
LICENSE.
1. To trade. - See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 7, 10.
2. To sell liquors. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 23.
LIEN. See ADMinALTY, 1, 2; HUSBAND AND WxFE, 33; MEOHANICs' LIEN.
I. May exist against a light-boat building under contract for the United
States. Briggs vs. A Ligkt-Boat, 566.
2. Light-boat is a vessel within the statute. .d.
3. Fraudulent conveyance of land does not disturb a lien, and it is there
fore not payable out of proceeds from a sale under subsequent judgment.
Hoffma's Appeal, 309.
IMITATION. See AMENDMENT, 2; ASSIGNMENT FOR BENEFIT OF CREDITORS, 12,
ATTORNEY, 1; FENCE, 3; HUSBAND AND WIFE, 19; INSURANOE, 1, 2, 20;
MORTGAGE, 18; WATERCOURSE, 4-7.
1. The statute affects the remedy only, and belongs to the lezfori. Paine
vs. Drew, 881.
2. Therefore an action may be maintained in one state on a contract which
would be barred in the state where it was made. Id.
8. An action may be barred by a statute passed after the cause of action
accrued, if a reasonable portion of the time of limitation remain after the
enactment of the statute. Howell vs. Howell, 378.
4. The statutory exception against parties absent from the state applies to
those who never resided in the state. Paine vs. Drew, 381.
5. The statute begins to run against a note, payable in such portions, and
at such times as the directors of a company may require, from the time it is
given. Colgate vs. Buckingham, 60.
6. A verbal promise to pay a note has the same effect as a new n,,te. Sem
ott vs. Homer, 313.
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7. Where the defendant, has filed his account as a set-off, the plaintiff may
plead the statute to it, but only so much will be barred as had occrsid more
than six years prior to the date of plaintiff's writ. Rollins vs. Horn, 882.
8. Maintenance of fence in a highway for forty years gives a right to con-
tinue it there as against the public. Cutter vs. Cam'ridge, 316.
LIS PENDENS. See ACTION, 2, 3.
The plea of lispendens in another state is no defence. SmithT vs. Lathop, 107.
LUNATIC. See DEFD, 7; HUSBAND AND WIYN, I5; MldiTAL UNSOUNDNESS;
SENILE DEMENTIA.
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION.
Judgment in favor of plaintiff sufficient but not conclusive evidence of
probable cause, though reversed on second trial Palmer vs. Avery, 637.
MANDAMUS. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 24.
1. Is not a writ of right, but is discretibnary with the court. The Peape
z rel. Keyes vs. The Auditor of Public Acc unts of Illinois, 332.
2. The court will not entertain jurisdiction where substantial interests are
not involved. Id.
3. A demurrer to a return to an alternative writ of mandamus, setting up
facts, some of which are provable by the legislative journals only, and some
by parol evidence, admits not only the facts resting on record evidence, but
all facts necessarily existing outside of, and never appearing upon the jour-
nals, so far as they would be proper evidence for any purpose. .1
4. In a case involving public interests, the issue of a peremptory writ will
be stayed on suggestion of collusion. State vs. Avery, 376.
5. Should not issue unless the relator's, right is clear to have the things
sought by it done, and unless the party sought to be coerced ought to do it.
People ex rel. Hailems vs. The _-cretawy of State, 814.
6. Confers no new right. Can only compel the performance of an existing
duty. Id.
7. Will not lie to compel a governor of a state to perform an official
duty. Id.
MARSHALLING, IN EQUITY. See MoaTGAOz, 3, 15, 16.
MASTER AND SERVANT. See CONTRACT. 14-16; RAILOAD, 7.
1. Neglect of master to use safety-plug in his steam-boilbr required b;
statute, entitles his servant to recover for injuries resulting from an explo-
sion. Cayzer vs. Taylor, 187.
2. Master is responsible for injuries occasioned by the incompetency of a
fellow-servant, or defect in machinery. Id.
MECHANIC'S LIEN. See LIEN, 1.
1. Is waived by acceptance of note. Green vs. Fz, 506.
2. Under an entire contract, if there is no lien for the whole work and ma-
tcrialS, there is none for any part. Morrion vs. M1iot, 64.
MENTAL UNSOUNDNESS AS AFFECTING TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY, 1,
385.
MINES AND MINING RIGHTS. See DAMAos.
1. A mining right, under the Mexican ordinances, is a title within the Act
of 1851-and the Board of Land Commissioners bad jurisdictionl of such a
claim. United States vs. 'astillero, 52.
2. The ordinances of the King of Spain, made in 1783, prescribe the mode
of acquiring title to mines, and were in force in Mexico at the date of the
conquest of California., Id.
MORTGAGE. See BANKS, 10, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 42; CoRPOuaTioN, 1; Ex .
CUTION, 2; HUSBAND AND WIER, 9; INSURANCE, 39; TENDER.
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I Of the inaking and recording.
1. Defeasance need not be of same date as the deed. McIntire vs. Saw,
816.
2. Mortgage recorded after judgments is entitled to priority if judgment-
creditors had actual knowledge of it before the debts were contracted.
Britton's Appeal, 573.
3. Where the mortgagor sells portions of the land at different times, that
which he retains will, in equity, be held primarily liable for the whole debt:
and if not sufficient, the several parcels sold will be liable in the inverse order
of such sales, beginning with the parcel last sold. Brown vs. Simons, 154.
4. Provided, however, that the previous conveyances not registered, are
subject to be postponed to subsequent registered conveyances. Id.
5. Mortgage to secure all existing debts without naming them is not void
for uncertainty. Michigan Ins. Co. vs. Brown, 46.
IL Of the Rights of Parties and of Title.
6. The mortgagee in a mortgage made to secure a negotiable promissory
note for liquors sold in violation of law, may convey a good title thereto by
assigning the same with the note, before its maturity, to one who takes them
for a valuable consideration without notice. Taylor vs. Page, 121.
7. The assignee of a mortgage on land subject to re-entry for non-payment
of rent on a lease in fee, is entitled to tack the rent actually paid to protect
his interest, to the amount of his mortgage, where the mortgagor has assumed
such payment of rent. " Robinson vs. Ryan et at., 58.
8. The conveyance of an equity of redemption of land which is subject to a
mortgage containing a power of sale, gives to the grantee the right to the
surplus, upon a sale of the premises under the power. Buttrick-vs. Went-
worth et al., 121.
9. Where one having a right of redemption redeems the mortgaged pre-
mises by the payment of money, the transaction will be treated as an assign-
ment of the mortgage. Hindr vs. Ballot, 126.
10. The quit-claim deed of a mortgagee in possession is sufficient to trans-
fer his interest under the mortgage. Id.
11. The purchaser at a mortgage sale under an attempted statutory fore-
closure, void as against the mortgagor for want of notice, stands as an as-
signee of the mortgage. Robinson vs. Ryan et al., 58.
12. Surrender of defeasance and acceptance of new bond for consideration
partly new, gives grantee a title in fee. Falls vs. Conway In. Co., 506.
13. The purchaser who fails to require the production of the bond, is
chargeable with notice of any defect in the assignor's title thereto. Kellogg
vs. Smith, 499.
14. A mortgagee in possession and taking the rents and profits, can acquire
no title against the mortgagor or his assignee, by a purchase of the land at
a sale for the taxes upon it; but he may add the sum paid for such taxes, to
the mortgage-debt as expenses necessarily incurred in protecting the estate.
Brown vs. Simons, 154.
15. The release by the mortgagee of a portion of the land mortgaged with
the knowledge of a prior sale of another portion, will operate as to such prior
purchaser as a discharge pro tanto of the mortgage-debt. Id.
16. The doctrine of subrogation and equitable contribution discussed. Note
to Brown vs. Simons, 154.
Ill. Remedy on a Mortgage.
17. Equity follows the analogies of the law where an analogous relief is
sought upon a similar claim, "but where the relief sought is in its nature of
equitable, not legal cognisance, equity follows its own rules. Michigan Ins.
Co. vs. Brown, 46.
18. Therefore, on a bill for foreclosure and praying a personal decree
against the mortgagor for the balance that should be due if the mortgaged
premises should prove inadequate, the court will decree the foreclosure, but
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the personal decree under the statute being in the nature of a legal remedy,
will not be made after such length of time as would have barred an action at
law on the bond. Michigan Ins. Co. vs. Brown, 46.
19. In a suit for a foreclosure brought by a prior mortgagee against the
mortgagor and subsequent mortgagees, where the bill alleges that the peti-
tioner indorsed a note of a certain date and amount for the mortgagor, under
the mortgage, but contains no allegation that the note was a renewal of a
former one: Held, that evidence to prove the note to have been given in re-
newal of & former note was inadmissible. Boswell vs. Goodwin et al., 79.
20. Where a mortgage has been given to indemnify an accommodation in-
dorser of a note, and the note at maturity is not paid, but renewed, with a
renewal of the indorsement, the security applies to the renewal note in the
same manner as to the original one. So long as the renewal note is not paid
the indorser is not indemnified for his original indorsement. Id.
21. A conditional judgment may be rendered in an action to foreclose a
mortgage of land which does not convey an existing estate of homestead there-
in. Doyle vs. Coburn, 120.
22. Sale under power while suit to foreclose is pending is fraudulent.
Hurd vs. Cone, 632.
23. Bond for appeal in bill to foreclose, does not stay sale. Orchard vs.
Hughes, 694.
24. Execution cannot issue on decree for foreclosure for balance due after
sale. Id.
25. This applies to Territorial Court of Nebraska. Id.
IV. Mortgage of Future Acquired Property.
26. A railroad company authorized its president to issue bonds secured by
a mortgage on the road and .its franchises. The president executed an
instrument reciting his authority, and proceeding in his name aff president to
mortgage the road, &c., but he signed the instrument in his own name sim-
ply. Afterwards, the company issued two sets of bonds, secured by second
and third mortgages in due form. The first bonds not having been paid when
'due, the trustees filed a bill to foreclose the mortgage, and thereupon it was
hdd, that the corporation had a legal competency to pledge its credit for the
procurement of rails, and to secure payment by a mortgage. Miller ei al. vs.
The Rutland Railroad Co., 616.
27. The instrument executed by the president not being executed by or in
the name of the corporation, cannot operate as its deed. Id. -
28. The transaction in a court of equity is an equitable mortgage, and thus
entitles the holders of what was intended to secure the first mortgage-bonds,
to their full right in equity to the mortgage intended to be given. Id.
29. The trustees under the second and third mortgages were the agents of
the holders of bonds under such mortgages, and actual notice to said trustees
of the equitable first mortgage, was notice to the bpndholders, who therefore
took their bonds subject to all the legal consequences of the existence of the
said equitable first mortgage. Id.
80. The corporation had sufficient interest in the subject-matter of the
mortgages upon which said mortgage wouldlawfully be operative. Id.
81. There is no need of a preliminary decree for the reformation of the
deed, and the court can give immediate effect to the instrument, as if it were
reformed in pursuance of a decree of equity. Id.
32. A mortgage of personal property not in existence, or not owned at the
time by the mortgagor, is valid, where it is sufficiently defined as the product
of, or as incident to something in present4 so as to be presumed -within the
minds of the parties to the mortgage. Morrill et al. vs. Noyes, 18.
83. Subject discussed. Note to Morrill vs. Noyes, 80.
IV. Of Indemnity and to secure Future Advances.
84. Mortgage to secure future advances where the mortgagee has definitely
agreed to make such advances when recorded, is not affected by a subsequent
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mortgage of the same property, though the advances may be made after such
record. Boswell vs. Goodwin et al., 79.
35. Where, however, it is optional with the mortgagee to make the advances
or not, and he has actual notice of a later mortgage upon the same property
for an existing debt or liability, such later mortgage will take precedence of
the prior one as to all advances made after notice. Id.
36. Whether the record of the later mortgage would not be sufficient notice
to the prior mortgagee; and whether a mortgage to secure future advances, to
be made or not at the option of the mortgagee, should not stand in all
respects as if it was executed at the time the advances are in fact made:
Quere. Id.
37. It makes no difference that such later mortgage is given to secure
future advances to be made or not at the option. of the mortgagee, so long as
the advances under it are actually made before the advances under the prior
mortgage over which they claim precedence. Id.
38. A knowledge of the existence of the later mortgage is enough to affect
the prior mortgagee, as to his future advances, even though he be not notified
of the advances actually made under the later mortgage. Id.
39. Effect of registration. Note to .Boswell vs. Goodwin, 91.
40. Instrument held not to be for indemnity merely. Butler vs. La Due
248.
V. Chattel Mortgage. See SHIPPING, 4, 5; VENDOR, 11. -
41. A mortgage of personal property in and about a 'hotel, including
"things of every name and nature, situate and being in and- about it," will
embrace a sail-boat upon the water near it, and used in connection with it.
Yeazi vs. Somerhy, 64.
42. Purchase at a sheriff's sale of property subject to'a chattel mortgage,
and subsequently of the mortgage, is not necessarily a satisfaction of the
mortgage. Brown vs. Rich, 188.
43. Act df Congress as to-recording mortgage of a vessel does not supersede
state laws for same purpose. Akna Ins. Co. vs. Aldri h, 570,
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, 43; CfONTRACT, 9;
EQUITY, 4; NEOLToENCE, 2.
1. Authority to subscribe for stock "as fully as any individual," authorizes
issue of bonds in payment. Seybert vs. Pittsburgh, 629.
2. Such subscriptions are constitutional. Gelpeke vs. Dubugue, 629.
3. Not liable in foreign attachment for bounty voted to volunteer. Brown
vs. Heath, 125.
4. Cannot be made garnishee in attachment. Burnham vs. Fond-du-Zac,
509.
5. Cannot appropriate money to individuals for expenses in procuring its
charter. Frost vs. Belmont, 374.
6. Liability for negligence of its contractors. Note to Painter vs. Pitts-
burgh, 358.
7. A verdict and judgment against a city, in an action for personal injuries
occasioned by a defect in a highway, are conclusive evidence in a subsequent
action by the city against the tenant of the land, who had notice of the pen-
dency of the former suit. Boston vs. Worthington, 186.
8. Proceedings in the construction of public works by commissioners.
People vs. Yonkers, 124.
9. Election of clerk. Duty of officers to be present at the election. .Rm-
hall vs. Marshall, 125.
NEGLIGENCE. See BLLS, 28, 29; MASTER Aaf SERVANT, 1. 27; MUNIIPAL
CORPORATION, 7: RAILROAD, II.
1. Where a person employs another, exercising a distinct employment, to
do work by a special contract, for a stipulated sum, and does not inte.rfere
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with the mode of performance, he is not responsible for the acts or negligence
of the contractor or his employees. Painter vs. The City of Pittsburgh, 350.
2. This.rule applies with full force to municipal corporations. Id.
a. The case of Bush vs. Steinman, 1 Bos. & Pull 404, rejected as authority.
Id.
4. Liability for acts of a contractor. Note to Painter vs. Pittsburgh, 858.
5. There is no privity to make a sub-contractor liable to principal. Bissell
vs. Roden, 688.
6. A. party suing must show that he was not himself guilty of such negli-
gence as contributed to the injury. Tefer vs. Northern Railroad Co., 665.
7. Where a person in crossing a railroad track is injured by collision with
the train, the fault primfacie is his own, and he must show affirmatively that
it is not, before he can recover. Id.
8. In an action by surviving relatives for death caused by negligence, the
measure of damages is the pecuniary loss merely, and in estimating that, the
chances of health and life are to be considered as well as the value of ser-
vices. Id.
9. The reciprocal duties of railroad companies and persons crossing the
track discussed. Id.
10. Is for the jury. Huelsenkamp vs. Citizens' Railroad Co., 633.
11. Carrier not liable if person injured by his own negligence. Id.
12. Injury to plaintiff by his own negligence. Todd vs. Old Colony Rail-
road Co., 505.
13. Familiarity with a dangerous place is to be regarded in determining a
person's negligence or care in passing it. Smith vs. Lowell, 251.-
14. Person is liable for damages caused by sparks from a steam-engine
used without precaution to prevent injury. Teall vs. Barton, 818.
15. An action for injury to plaintiff's house will fail if it appear that the
injury was partly the result of water dripping from the house itself. Martin
vs. Simpson, 316.
16. Turning diseased sheep into lot adjoining where another's sheep are
kept. Fisher vs. Clark, 638.
NEGOTIABLE BONDS. See COURTS, 15; MORTGAGN, 26-29; MuNiecxrL Co-
PORATION, 1, 2.
1. Bonds of a railroad company, under its corporate seal or not, payable to
A. B., or the holder thereof, are negotiable. The Connecticut Ins.. Co. vs. The
Cleveland, Ije., Railroad Co., 448.
2. If interest coupons, annexed to a bond of this description, are not paid
when due, interest should be allowed. Id.• 8. An indorser of such bond "for value received," is not to be deemed an
accommodation indorser. Id.
4. Power of corporations to make such indorsements or guarantees of each
other's bonds; the consideration therefor, and the rights of holders of the
bonds. Id.
5. Holder of coupon payable to bearer may recover amount with interest
and exchange. Gelpeke vs. Dubugue, 629.
NOTARY. See BzLs AND NOTES, 28-81.
How far he is a public officer. Note to American Epress Co. vs. Dunlevy, 271
NOTICE. See INsun.&sw, 22, 40; MORTGAGE, 11, 18, 29, 85-39.
NUISANCE. See Eurry, 2; STRAMS, 2.
OFFICE. See QUo WARRANTO.
ONUS PROBANDL See ConsPouAToN, 8; CsrkL A LAw, 18; VzNDoR, 6.
PARTITION.
1. Where proceedings are properly taken to bind unknown owners, they
INDEX.
PARTITION.
are concluded as to a paramount title in severally as well as their interest in
common. Kane vs. Rock River Co.. 5 ').
2. Sufficiency of proceedings to b.nl unicnown owners. Id.
PARTNERSHIP. See ASSIGNMENT FOR BFli',FFIT OF CREDITORS, 6; CONSTITUTIONAL
LAw, 3-5; HUSBAND AND WIFE, 34; 1.iSURANCR, 9, 10.
1. Firm not liable for debt contracred by partner in his own name though
with partnership funds and for partnership purposes. N. Penn. Coal Co.'s
Appeal, 572.
2. On failure of firm and sale of the land partnership-creditors only are
entitled to proceeds. Id.
3. Where the separate estate of an insolvent partner is more than sufficient
to pay his separate debts, the surplus is to be applied to paying joint debts,
before paying interest. Thomas vs. Minot, 185.
4. Manufacturing corporation cannot form partnership with an individual.
Whittenton vs. Mills, 184.
5. Such nominal partnership cannot be put into insolvency. Id.
6. Heirs of deceased partner cannot be made parties to a suit involving the
title to lots assigned by the surviving partner-of an- insolvent firm. Bothwell
vs. Dewes, 50.
7. Partners are liable for trespass by themselves or their employees in the
conduct of their business. McKnight vs. Ratcliff, 310.
8. But a special partner is not so liable thoigh he may have done some act
unconnected with the trespass which would make him generally liable for the
debts of the firm. Id.
9. Special partner cannot claim as a creditor of an insolvent firm, of which
he was a member. Dunning's Appeal, 312.
10. Special partner cannot be made personally liable except by his own.
acts or those of his partners, which he knows and assents to. Singer vs.
Kelley, 310.
PATENT.
Purchaser of machine from grantee of right to sell, may use machine after
expiration of his vendor's license. Bloomer vs. Millinger, 695.
PLEADING. See DUaEss; FALSE IMPIISONMENT, 3; MANDAMUS, 3.
I. Replication withdrawn after being held insufficient on demurrer, and
new one filed. Waiver of writ of error on first. Clearwater vs. Meredith, 695.
2. Judgment on demurrer. Id.
3. A judgment under the Code must be based on the pleadings, and is not
to be given for the defendant, for a cause of action he has not set up.by way
of defence or counter claim. Wright vs. .Delafield et al., 58.
PfLACTICE. See ADxnALTY, 8, 4; COURTS, 6, 7; CovENANT, 3; Poozss, 1;
TRIAL, 1.
PRESCRIPTION. See FENcE, 1, 3; LIXTATiON, 8; WATEacouRsx, 4, 5, 7.
PRIVILEGE. See CORONER.
PRIZE. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 8.
1. It is the duty of the Prize Court to determine what ships shall share in
the proceeds of a prize; but it is the province of the Secretary of the Navy to
decide what persons constituted the officers and crews of such ships, and the
share which each shall receive. The Cherokee, 289.
2. All prizes belong primarily to the Government, and any person claiming
to participate therein must show a grant from the Government.- Id.
3. The English prize acts and the decisions under them examined and com
mented on at length. Id.
4. The origin and growth of the doctrine of constructive capture stated. Id.
5. The English doctrine of constructive capture by association is enurely
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judicial, has not been uniform, is not well defined or settled, &ad appears"
finally to have been discarded. The Cherokee, 289.
6. Th6 statutes of the United States provide expressly for two classes of
ships which shall share the proceeds of a prize:
(1). Those making the capture;
(2). Those within signal distance of the vessel making the capture. ..4
7. The statutes of the United States having thus adopted only a portion of
the English doctrine of constructive capture, our courts wil not go beyond
the limits thus assigned them. id.
8. The United States Prize Acts of 1799, 1800, and 1862 commented on. Id.
9. The statutes also provide different rules of distribution of the proceeds
where the prize was of equal or superior and where it was of inferior force to
the vessel or vessels making the capture. The Atlanta, 675.
10. In estimating the relative force of the prize for the purpose of such
distribution, only the first class of captors are to be conside'ed. Id.
PROCESS. See sutAxcs, 20.
Service made by a trick by which defendant was got within the jurisdiction
will be set aside. Hetcalf vs. Clark, 602.
QUO WARRANTO.
1. Must be brought during the official lifetime of the officer. Officer de
facto will be considered also de jure as to all official acts, unless judicially.
removed before expiration of term. Com. vs. snith, 574.
2. Termination of office during pendency of. People vs. .Hartwell. 764.
RAILROAD. See CoMmoic Cm zrs; ConpoBA&zoii; MORTOAGE, 26-80; NEGLI-
GENCE, 7, 9; NEGOTIAB L BONDS.
I. General Power.
1. Power to mortgage its franchise. Niote to Morrill vs. Noyes, 80.
2. Power to discriminate between "local" and other freight. -Toelts vs.
Penn. Railroad Co., 72&
3. May be a corporation defacto as against a subscriber to stock, though it
could not stand against the people. Buffalo, 4c., Railroad Co. vs. Cary, 497.
4. Act of Legislature authorizing consolidation of connecting roads. Effect
on contracts. Clearwater vs. Meredith, 695.
IL Liabilities.
5. Not liable for loss of baggage on connecting road over *hich it sells a
ticket, if the ticket contains a printed stipulation that the company assumes
no such responsibility. Penn. Railroad Co. v. Schwarzenberger, 672.
6. Company issuing ticket for excursion over several lines, and sending its
baggage-car through, is liable for loss of baggage anywhere on the route.
Hajac vs. Boston, Ic., Railroad Co., 567."
7. Liable for negligence of driver of street car in assisting passengers to
get aboard. Drew vs. Sixth Av. Railroad Co., 498.
8. Where passenger is an infant. Id.
9. Measure of damages in such case. Id.
10. If a passenger is lawfully on the cars, the company is.bound to carry
him safely, without regard to the kind of cars, or the payment of fare. Ohi,
4c., Railroad Co. vs. Huhling, 812.
11. Charging of illegal fare in New York. Chase vs. N. Y. Central Railroad
Co., 635.
12. The Massachusetts Statute, 1840, c. 85, 1, providing for damages for
property set on fire by sparks, &c., extends to personal property. Ross v&
Boston, itc., Railroad Co., 251.
REAL ESTATE. See INsunAeoz, 27-29; WILL, 9.
RECEIVER. See CoRPouTow, III. ; INSURAsNC, 45.




The doctrine of relation being a fiction of law, is to be resorted to only for
the advancement of justice; and has not been adopted as a rule when third
persons, who are not parties, or privies, might be prejudiced thereby. Pierce
vs. Ball, 503.
RELEASE. See 1,oRToAGr, 15.
1. Covenant may be release for one purpose, but not for all. Ledyer vs.
Stanton, 691.
2. The effect of releases on contingent interests discussed. .Nole to Moore
vs. Littel, 151.
REMAINDER. See ESTATE.
RENT. See LANDLORD AND TENANT; MORTGAGE, 7.
REPLEVIN. See SUNDAY.





Contracts of Sale and of Bailment, 821,
SECURITY. See BiLns, 87; IisvrwecE, 26; MORTGAGE, 6, 20, 84-40; VENDOR,
4, 17.
1. A president of a corporation who las-received bonds from his company
to hold as collateral security for an indorser for the company, becomes a
trustee, and is personally responsible for the execution of the trust. Wil-
kinson vs. Stewart, 318.
2. Sale for less than value. Iletcher vs. Dickinson, 505.
3. Application by holder. Wtlcoz vs. Bank, 567.
SENILE DEMENTIA, 449.
SET-OFF. See CONFIrT OF LAws, 2; LIMITATIO, 7.
A trustee has the right to set off all bona fide claims against the principa.
debtor, though the property may have come into his possession by an arrange-
ment, clearly fraudulent as against creditors. Kelly vs. Elion and Truetee, 126.
SHERIFF. See ASSIGNMZNT FOR BENEFIT OF CREDITORS, 12.
1. A sheriff is estopped from showing that goods, left with a receiptor who
claimed to be the owner, did not belong to the judgment-debtor, where he has
obtained a judgment for their value for non-delivery against such receiptor.
The People ez rel. Kinap et al. vs. Reeder, Sheriff, 57.
2. In making a levy should allow for the sacrifice of public sale. French
vs. Snyder, 812.
8. In an action against a sheriff for an insufficient levy he should show tha
he used reasonable diligence as to the sufficiency of the property he took.
Id.
4. In such action the measure of damages is the actual loss to the plaintiff
by the sheriff's neglect. Id.
SHERIFF'S SALE. See LIEN, 8.
SHIPPING. See ADmIRALTY, 5; LIEN, 2; MORTGAGE, 41, 48.
1. Seaman under void articles may leave vissel and recover wages to ...
time. Roberts vs. Knights, 697.
2. Articles held to be void. Id.
8. Reimbursement of advance where the ship is lost. Benner vs. rns. Co.,
816.
4. The statute of the United States requiring conveyances and mortgages
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of veseels to be recorded, applies only to such as have been enrolled, regip
tered, or licensed under the laws thereof. Veazie vs. Somerhy, 64.
5. The record of a mortgage or conveyance of a vessel must be made in the
district of the last registry and enrolment, though- not the home port of the
vessel. Potter vs. Fish, 187.
SOCIETY. See UZUNOORPORATBD SOOIETY.
SPECIE. See Buma Am NoTzs, 25; GRouND-RENT.
STAMP.
1. The cost of the stamp required by the U. S. Internal Revenue Act, to be
affixed to a deed, is properly a part of the expense'of making the deed, and is
to be paid by the party paying for the deed. McCreedy vs. Callahan, 241.
2. It being the custom in Philadelphia, in the absence of express contract,
for the purchaser to pay for the deed, he is also chargeable with the cost of
the stamp. Id.
3. Who to pay for stamp on deed. Note to McCreedy vs. Callahan, 242.
4. Whether duty payable on deeds of marriage settlement, &c., for a nomi-
nal consideration. LegaZ Miscellany, 116.
STARE DECISIS_ See CouRTs, 4, 8.
A question repeatedly decided is no longer open for discussion. Wright-d
al. vs. Bill, 54.
STATUTES. See CoNsTxTUTioNAL LAW, 44; Usurt, 8, 4.
Held directory. People vs. Hartwell, 764.
STATUTE OF FRAUDS. See AssuxpsxT, 2; Cow.ama 8, 5; VzNDm, 8, 10, 11.
1. Where it appears on the face of a bill, that an agreement concerning an
interest in lands is in parol, the defence of the Statute of Frauds may be
taken advantage of on demurrer. Bandall vs. Howard; 55.
2. A. sold notes and mortgage, and verbally guaranteed both notes and
security. Warranty held not within the statute. Huntingdon vs. Wdllington,
182.
STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU. See VZNDon, 2.
STREAMS. See WATzncounsR.
1. The internal streams of a state, above the tide and above boat naviga-
tion, are in some sense public highways for the floating of logs, in those parts
of the state where this species of transportation is of indispensable necessity
to, and has been long acquiesced in by, the inhabitants. Feazie vs. .Dwined,
716-
2. In regard to such streams, those vho erect and use mills thereon are
bound to make and use such mills with reference to the correlative right in
the owners of timber land adjoining such streams, to float the same to market;
and any unreasonable obstruction of this latter use of the stream will be a
common nuisance. Id.
SUBROGATION. See MORTGAGE, 8, 15, 16.
SUNDAY. See IhsuaAxcs, 43.
Replevin may be maintained for goods sold on.. Ducker vs. Mowrey, 766.
flURETY. See BrLs AND NoTEs, 14.
1. Where a surety signs upon the assurance that the principal will als9
procure two other persons specified, to sign -the bond before he delivers the
same, which he fails to do, but this is wholly unknown to the obligee at the
time he accepts the bond, such surety is bound to perform the obligation
York Countu Ins. Co. vs.-Brooks, 899.
2. Where the third surety upon a bond signs under the belief that the
former signatures are genuine, but one vf them is, in fact, forged by the
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principal in the bond, who erases such forged signature before he delivers
the same to the obligee, who is wholly ignorant of these facts at the time, such
surety cannot defend against the obligation. Fork Co. Ins. Co. vs. Brooks, 899.
8. Effect of signing on the faith of having co-sureties which are never
obtained. Note to Inarance Co. vs. Brooks, 402.
4. How far surety may be estopped by his act from showing that his signa-
ture was fraudulently obtained. Id.
5. Alteration of times of paying interest after execution of a note discharges
surety. Dewey vs. Reed, 188.
6. Where E. signed an application of C.'s to be supplied with gas-light and
a meter on certain premises, as surety: it was held, that he was only liable
for gas supplied to C., and not for that furnished to a subseauent tenant.
MBanhattan Gas-i"ght Co. vs. Ely, 60.
SURVIVING RALATIVES, ACTION BY. See NzEOLIGNOR, 8.
SWAMP LANDS.
Character of the grant by Congress to Illinois-policy gf the state-ights
of purchasers, &a. S pervisor& vs. Burchell, 681.
TAXES. See WILD LANDs.
An action will not lie to restrain the collection of taxes, on the bare ground
of the assessment being illegal. Susguehanna Bank vs. Board of Suzvr~ors,
56.
TENANT IN COMMON.
1. Purchase by tenant in common of an outstanding title, enures to the
benefit of his co-tenants. Bothwell vs. Dewees, 50.
2. The rule applies to the husband of one of the tenants in common, Id.
8. A deed by a tenant in common of "sixty-four rods being part of" the
lot held in common, passes no title in common; nor in severalty without pos-
session taken under it of the part claimed. Phillips vs. 2 dor, 184.
4. Where a tenant in common erects a building upon.4 portion of the land,
it is such an exclusive appropriation to his own use as will entitle his co-
tenant to maintain trespass. Benett vs. Clemence et al., 12L
5. Denial of rights of co-tenant by tenant in common of personalty is con-
version and will sustain assumpsit RFiguet vs. Allison, 766.
TENDER.
Where the mortgagor's assignee offered to pay the mortgage-debt, at the
same time producing the money in a pocket-book, a part of which was in
bank notes, and the holder of the mortgage refused to receive it without
making any objection to the amount or kind of money, the tender was valid.
Brown vs. Simons, 154.
TIMBER.
City ordinance of New Bedford in regard to. Bhig vs. A L -toBoat, 566.
TORT. See AOTxON, 2; HUsBAND AND WIFE, 27-81.
TRESPASS. See ASSIoGMENT FoX BEsuxT OF CREDITORS, 10; PAATNZRSM, 7,
8; TENANT IN COMMON, 4.
TRIAL.
Points presented on trial which are true but not applicable should be die,
affrmed on that ground. NcKnight vs. Ratclf 7ef al., 310.
TROVER. See CORPORATION, 7.
1. Where the pledgee of dock warrants as security sold the property in dock
the day before the loan was due'and delivered the warrants the next day, it
was a conversion although the pledger was bankrupt and would not have re-




2. Per EELE, 0. J., ByLEs and KEATiNG, 3J. The measure of damages was
the luss actually sustained by the pledger. Id.
8. Per WmLiAms, J. It was the value of the goods at the time of the con-
Tersion. Id.
TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES. See AomsT, 8; CoRPoRATION, 4; COURTS, 1; SZOU-
BITY, 1; SET-OFF.
1. A sale and conveyance by a trustee, of the trust property, where he be-
comes the purchaser, is not void, but is capable of confirmation by the act of
the cetui guo trust. And a title acquired by a subsequent bonafide purchaser
without notice, is good. Johnson vs. Bennett, 123.
2. Though the trustee may have acted bona fide yet courts will. open the sale,
if the cestuis gqu trust are not satisfied with it. Id.
8. A cestui gue trust, having assented to a sale made by. the trustee, by
accepting his share of the proceeds, cannot maintain ejectment, for his share
of the land, on the ground that the sale was void. Id.
4. A purchase on behalf of another, must be held to be in trust for the prin-
cipal Bothwell vs. Dewees, 50.
UNINCORPORATED SOCIETY.
1. A deed of land to an organized and acting, though unincorporated,
religious society, vests a valid title in the grantees as a body, and does not
create a tenancy in common among the individuals who compose the society.
Hamblett and Wife vs. Bennett, 817.
2. Rights of the committee in charge of such property, and of members of
the society. Id.
UNITED STATES NOTES AND STOCKS. See CoNsTnur on. LAw, IL
USURY. See ExEcuTon, I.
1. Where a contract is simply for a loan of money, any profit made or loss
imposed upon the, borrower in addition to the legal rate of interest, is usury.
Buttrick vs. Harris, 112.
Where, however, an addition is made for the price of exchange, not for the
loan or forbearance, but as compensation for accepting payment in a place
less convenient, or where money is less valuable, the contlact will be law-
ful. Id.
8. A statute authorizing a party who has paid usurious interest to sue for
the excess within one year is cumulative, and does not take away the right of
the borrower to an actiou at common law. Porter vs. Mount et al., 493.
. 4. A provision in such statute, that if the party paying usury shall not
bring his action within one year, another person (such as a superintendent
of the poor) may then sue for and recover the amount paid for usury within
three years after such first year, does not absolutely suspend the right of action
of the party paying the usury, but he may still sue at any time before suit
actually brought by such public officer. Id.
5. Dictum of SPENcER, C. J., in Wheaton vs. Hibbard, 20 Johns. 290, over-
ruled. Id.
6. A married woman is liable in an action for taking usurious interest, and
judgment may be given against her separate estate as if she were sole. Id.
7. Taking of accommodation note from payee for less than its face is
usurious, even without notice. Whitten vs. Hayden, 696.
VENDOR AND VENDEE. See HUSBAND AND WIFz, 26-33; STAMP.
1. Omission to discover want of signature to bill of lading is mistake of fact
for which sale--may be rescinded, and agent of vendor may yield to the
- rescission. Quimby vs. Carr, 697.
2. Stoppage of goods in transitu does not rescind the contract, and vendors
are entitled to pro rata distribution out of the insolvent estate. Patten's
Appeal, 578.
3. A contract for sale of goods is not taken out of the Statute of Frauds by
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payment of part of the purchase-money, unless at the time of the sale. Bissell
vs. Balcom, 253.
4. Where a portion of goods sold have been returned and reaccepted at a
reduced price, the uriginal sale is not thereby avoided so as to discharge a
guarantor. Rice vs; .Filene, 249.
5. Where goods are sold by sample, and both sample and goods contain
defects, there is no implied warranty against the defects. Dickinscn vs.
Gay, 506.
6. Where the equitable owner of a thing pbrmits the legal owner to retain-
possession of the documentary evidence of title, and it is sold to a third party,
the burden of proof is on the equitable owner to show that the purchaser had
notice of his rights. Calais Steamboat Co. vs. Scudder, 52.
7. In New York, the rule of caveat emptor is subject to the exception that a
warranty of title in the vendor is implied, where he is in possession at the
time of sale. Scranton vs. Clark, 124.
8. The possession of the vendor is the foundation- of the implied war-
ranty. Id.
9. Sale of personal property without disclosure of defective title-waiver
of the fraud by purchaser. Sweetman vs. Prince, 570.
10. Plucking a handful of grass and delivering it to-a purchaser, on a sale
of the grass, is not such a consteuctive delivery, as will pass the title against
third persons. .Lamson vs. Patch, 64.
11. Where a vendor sold sufficient goods "now on my premises," to pay a
sum of money advanced by plaintiff, and delivered a specific mass more than
enough to pay the amount, but they were not removed, and the premises were
subsequently sold, with notice of the facts and subject to plaintiff's claim, the
legal title and ownership of the goods passed to the plaintiff. The transaction
was an executed sale in the nature of a mortgage, and the purchaser with
notice had no title'as against the plaintiff, and could convey none to a third
party even without notice, and the original transfer was valid without filing
as a chatter mortgage. Wooater et al. vs. Sherwood, 67.
12. Showing the pieces of several machines and offering to put one together,
is not a delivery to entitle the plaintiffs to recover the contract price. Gan-
son vs. .Madjan, 508.
13. Contra, if they had set apart a machine for defendants. Id.
14. Failure to deliver proper quantity of goods is a bar to an action for the
price of goods delivered. Catlin vs. Tobias, 571.
15. Vendee may use the goods as delivered without waiver of defence for
breach of contract. Ii
16. Vendor having informed the agent sent to buy goods of his price, and
the agent, though he had no authority to make a bargain, having taken away
the goods, vendor may recover the price named. Booth vs. Bierce, 254.
17. Vendor not bound to abandon his lien until purchase-money paid,
though he may have accepted new collateral security. Johnson vs. Scott, 684.
VERBAL DECLARATIONS OF DECEASED PERSONS AS EVIDENCE, 64L
VESSEL. See ADun.ALTY, 5; Lism, 2; MORTGAGE 41, 48; SmPPrrN.
WARRANTY. See BiLLs, 28, 24; EsTATE, 8; EsToPPEL, 8; HOMESTEAD, 1;
INsuANoj., 4, 87, 38, 41; STATUTE Or FRAuDs, 2; VENDOR, 4, 5, 7, 8.
WATERCOURSE. See STrasAe.
1. If the owners of a dam on a watercourse, by means of their dam, obstruct
the natural drainage from the land of another, to his actual injury, they are
liable to him therefor, although his land is not.situated upon the watercourse,
unless such obstruction was caused by them in the reasonable use of their
own land or privilege. Bassett vs. Salisbury Manufacturing Co., 228.
2. What is a reasonable use is a mixed question of law and fact. .d.




4. Twenty year' use of the water of a stream in a particular way is evi-
deuce of a right thus to use the water. Burnham vs. Kempton, 880.
5. The.same proof of user which establishes the right is equally conclusive
in establishing the limitation of that right. Id.
6. In action for swelling back water plaintiff can only recover for damages
for six years prior to the suit, whether the statute of limitations was pleaded
or not. Brown vs. Buh, 573.
7. A natural or artificial ,stone row" is such a dam as will acquire a right
by lapse of tie. Id.
8. Instrumental measurement of back water must yield to actual facts. IS
WAY.
Acquisition by user by several persons in succession. Leonards. Leonard,608.
WILD. LANDS.
Title of purchaser at tax sale. .Pierce vs. Hal, 03.
W11L. See MzNTa. UssouuNDNss; SENILE DaXuXXM
I. Of the Making and Proving of the Will.
1. Want of capacity cannot be proved by events subsequent to the making
of the will. Clarke vs. Davis, 875.
2. Inhuence to vitiate an act must amount to coercion equivalent to fore
and fear. Id.
8. Declarations of deceased are admissible to prove undue influence. Aforose
v. Ciot , 765.
4. Mere absence from the state of an attesting witness. does not authorize
proof of the will by proving handwriting.. Stow vs. Stow, 875.
6. In New York, a will, whether it disposes of real or of personal property,
speaks as of the time of the testator's death. M¢Araughton et a. vs. Ac.?'augh-
ton, 502.
6. What are assets where widow elects -to take against the will. ?lymptos
vs. Plymptox, 874.
7. Effect of such election on the provisions of the will as to other parties.
I
IL coetrunctioft of Wit.
8. Courts are astute in finding exceptions to the rule that a devise of lands
Without words of limitation confers a life estate only. King v. Ackerman, 50.
9. Devise of "goods, chattels, rights and credits, -and effects," does not
pass realty. Brown vs. Furman, 683.
10. Where a testator divided the residue of his estate between his brother
W., the chilaren of his sister H., and the daughter of his brother J., in equal
proportions: it was held, that the legateps were to take "per capita." Lee,
Ezetutot, vs. lits, 59.
11. Where to a devise of land without words of limitation a provision is
added that the devisee may do therewith as he pleases, or is directed to pay
debts or a sum in gross, he takes a fee. King vs. Ackerman, 50.
12. A court may look beyond a will to e'!lain an ambiguity as to the per-
son lr property, but not to enlarge an estate. Id.
13. What was held void as creating a perpetuity. Fosdick vs. Fosdick, 121.
14. Construction of word "heirs". Porter's Appeal, 575.
16. Construction of. Carter vs. Hunt, 252.
WITNESS. See Accorr RErNwm, 1; AGEST, 8; Enzon, 8; HUSBAND AD W ,
89; WxL, 4. -
Objection to competency must be made before examination. Paft=on vs.
Wallace, 809.
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